Motion to support the draft legislation with the following modifications:

21	(1) As used in this section:
22	(a) "Ensemble analysis" means the generation of a large set of simulated redistricting plans
	using nonpartisan, neutrally drawn criteria, for the purpose of creating a comparative distribution of expected electoral outcomes against which an individual may evaluate a proposed
	redistricting plan.
22 23	(a)(b) "Measures of partisan symmetry" means, for a congressional map:
23 24	(i) the partisan bias test; and
25	(ii) the outcome of the partisan bias test contextualized through a quantile analysis the mean-median test.;
26	(iii) based on the partisan index, a measure of proportionality, reflecting the deviation between the average statewide vote share and the expected seat share in a redistricting plan for each party; and
27	(iv) to the greatest extent practicable, an evaluation of the proposed congressional redistricting plan using an ensemble analysis to contextualize whether the electoral outcomes of a proposed plan fall within or outside the normal range of outcomes generated by neutrally drawn simulated plans.
28	(c) "Mean-media test" means an evaluation of partisan symmetry in a proposed redistricting plan:
<u>29</u>	(i) that calculates the difference between a party's average statewide vote share and the party's median vote share across all districts in a proposed redistricting plan; and
30	(ii) for which the divergence between the average and median percentages described in Subsection (1)(b)(i) reflects:
31	(A) the degree of partisan asymmetry;
32	(B) asymmetry in favor of a party with a median district vote share percentage above 50%; and
24 33	(C) asymmetry against a party with a median district vote share percentage below 50%.
25 34	(b)(d) "Partisan bias test" means an evaluation of partisan symmetry in a proposed
26 35	redistricting plan:
27 36	(i) that follows the following sequential steps:
28 <u>37</u>	(A) calculate each party's statewide vote share using the partisan index;
29 38	(B) calculate the difference between each party's statewide vote share and 50%;
30 39	(C) subtract the difference described in Subsection (1)(b)(i)(B) from each party's
31 40	vote share in each district in the proposed redistricting plan based on the
32 41	partisan index data for each census block within the district; and
33 42	(D) based on the adjusted vote share described in Subsection (1)(b)(i)(C),
34 43	calculate the difference between each party's expected seat share and 50% of
<u>3544</u>	the total seats in a hypothetical election, with the difference between the party's

36 45	seat share in the hypothetical election and 50% of the total seats representing
37 46	the degree of partisan bias; and
38	(ii) for which a-the result described in Subsection (1)(b)(i) other than the following fails
39 47	the test: reflects the degree of partisan asymmetry.
40	(A) for an even number of seats, 0; or
4148	(B) for an odd number of seats, 0.5.
<u>42</u> 49	(e)(e) "Partisan index" means an average of the partisan vote share:
43 <u>50</u>	(i) except as provided in Subsection (1)(c)(ii), in the three immediately preceding
44 <u>51</u>	statewide elections for each of the following offices:
<u>52</u>	(A) United States president;
45 <u>53</u>	(B) United States senator;
46 <u>54</u>	(B)(C) governor;
47 <u>55</u>	(C)(D) attorney general;
48 <u>56</u>	(D)(E) state treasurer; and
4 <u>9</u> 57	(E)(F) state auditor;
50 <u>58</u>	(ii) except as provided in Subsection (1)(c)(iii), that excludes an election for an office
51 <u>59</u>	in which the two largest political parties did not field a candidate; and
52 60	(iii) that allocates votes for an independent general election candidate to a political
53 <u>61</u>	party if the independent candidate attempted to win the nomination of the political
54 <u>62</u>	party at a primary election or party convention for the same general election.
55 —	(d) "Unduly favor or disfavor" in regards to Subsection (4) for purposes of a
56 63	congressional map, means the map is asymmetrical under the partisan bias test.
57 64	[(1)] (2) This Section establishes redistricting standards and requirements applicable to the
58 65	Legislature and to the Utah Independent Redistricting Commission.
59 66	[(2)] (3) The Legislature and the Commission shall abide by the following redistricting
60 <u>67</u>	standards to the greatest extent practicable and in the following order of priority:
61 <u>68</u>	(a) adhering to the Constitution of the United States and federal laws, such as the Voting
62 69	Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. Secs. 10101 through 10702, including, to the extent required,
63 70	achieving equal population among districts using the most recent national decennial
64 71	enumeration made by the authority of the United States;
65 72	(b) minimizing the division of municipalities and counties across multiple districts,
66 73	giving first priority to minimizing the division of municipalities and second priority
67 74	to minimizing the division of counties;
68 75	(c) creating districts that are geographically compact;
69 76	(d) creating districts that are contiguous and that allow for the ease of transportation

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70 77	throughout the district;
71 78	(e) preserving traditional neighborhoods and local communities of interest;
72 79	(f) following natural and geographic features, boundaries, and barriers; and
73 80	(g) maximizing boundary agreement among different types of districts.
74 81	[(3)] (4)(a) The Legislature and the Commission may not divide districts in a manner that
75 82	purposefully or unduly favors or disfavors any incumbent elected official, candidate
76 83	or prospective candidate for elective office, or any political party.
77	(b) A redistricting plan that is symmetrical under the partisan bias test does not unduly
78 84	favor or disfavor produces electoral outcomes that are materially outside the central range between the 2.5 th and 97.5 th percentiles, of the distribution in an ensemble analysis unduly favors or disfavors a political party under Subsection (4)(a), unless the proponent of the redistricting plan demonstrates compelling justification.
79 85	[(4)] (5) The Legislature and the Commission shall use judicial standards and the best
80 86	available data and scientific and statistical methods, including measures of partisan
<u>8187</u>	symmetry, to assess whether a proposed redistricting plan abides by and conforms to the
82 88	redistricting standards contained in this Section, including the restrictions contained in
83 89	Subsection [(3)] <u>(4)</u> .
84 <u>90</u>	[(5)] (6) Partisan political data and information, such as partisan election results, voting
85 91	records, political party affiliation information, and residential addresses of incumbent
86 92	elected officials and candidates or prospective candidates for elective office, may not be
87 93	considered by the Legislature or by the Commission, except as permitted under
88 <u>94</u>	Subsection [(4)] <u>(5)</u> .
89 95	[(6)] (7) The Legislature and the Commission shall make computer software and
90 96	information and data concerning proposed redistricting plans reasonably available to the
91 97	public so that the public has a meaningful opportunity to review redistricting plans and
92 98	to conduct the assessments described in Subsection [(4)] (5).
93	(8) Any judicial review of a congressional map to determine whether the Legislature or
94	Commission complies with this section shall use the partisan bias test described in this
95	section to determine whether a map unduly favors or disfavors any incumbent elected
96	official, candidate or prospective candidate for elective office, or any political party, for
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