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NOTE: You may notice textual errors throughout this document, many of which have been left intact from the original text. Should you want to investigate the integrity of the original report, please refer to the original two printed volumes containing the official report of the proceedings and debates.

Roll call showed a quorum present.

Prayer was offered by Rev. Geo. E. Jayne, pastor of the Second M. E. church.

Journal of the thirty-ninth day's session was read and approved.

The following petitions were presented asking that the question of woman's suffrage be submitted as a separate article to the vote of the people:

File No. 261, signed by J. Hegney and 46 others from Salt Lake, by Goodwin, of Salt Lake.

File No. 262, signed by G. A. Whitaker and 28 others from the board of labor
{934 - LEGISLATIVE}
of Salt Lake City, by Goodwin, of Salt Lake.

File No. 263, signed by Mary Ramjue and 26 others from Wellington, by Howard, of Emery County, by request.

File No. 264, signed by Fred Yates and 101 others from Millville, by Maughan of Cache, by request.

File No. 265, signed by L. H. Outzen and 90 others from Richfield, by Brandley, of Sevier, by request.

File No. 266, signed by H. Hughes and 144 others from Spanish Fork, by Creer, of Utah.

File No. 267, signed by S. W. Sharp and 53 others from Provo, by Corfman, of Utah.

File No. 268, signed by W. W. Davis and 24 others from Carr Fork, by Squires, of Salt Lake.

File No. 269, signed by Mrs. J. Niven and 40 others from Murray, by Haynes, of Salt Lake.

File No. 270, signed by W. W. Smith and 32 others from Rockport, by Eldredge, of Summit.

File No. 271, signed by Thos. Bradley and 86 others from Hyrum, by Thoresen, from Cache, by request.

File No. 272, signed by Isaac C. Emery and 8 others from Center, by Stover, of Tooele.

File No. 273, signed by F. A. King and 37 others from Hooper, by Kiesel of Weber.

File No. 275, signed by R. G. McQuarrie and 20 others from Silver Reef, by Ivins, of Washington.

File No. 276, signed by F. L. Cushing and 49 others from Carr Fork, by Squires, of Salt Lake.
Ordered filed.

The following petitions were presented asking that an equal suffrage clause be placed in the Constitution:

File No. 277, signed by L. P. Oveson and 114 others from Cleveland, by Howard, of Emery.

File No. 278, signed by George Harding and 237 others, by Wm. Lowe, of Box Elder.

File No. 279, from citizens of Brigham City in mass meeting assembled 150 favoring a clause be placed in the Constitution for woman suffrage, and forty against, 75 not voting, by Peters, of Box Elder.

File No. 280, signed by Geo. C. Murdock and 258 others from Beaver City, by Murdock, of Beaver.

File No. 281, signed by Henry E. Reddish and 203 others from Davis County. by Call, of Davis.

File No. 282, containing 1,010 names from Salt Lake City; 107 names from Deweyville; 23 names from Leeds; 163 names from Utah County; 285 names from Spring City; 290 names from Manti; 527 names from Salt Lake County, by Chidester, of Garfield.

Ordered filed.

Mr. Raleigh, of Salt Lake, presented File 283, signed by Geo. F. Goodwin and 47 others, asking that the question of prohibition be submitted as a separate article to a vote of the people.

Referred to committee on schedule, future amendments and miscellaneous.

The article on legislative was then taken up on third reading.

Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 were read.

Mr. EICHNOR. Mr. President, I move to amend section 8, line 6, after the word “commissioner,” by adding “school trustee.”

Mr. CORAY. Mr. President, I would like to ask a question for information. Is the state commissioner supposed to be an officer of the State and if so, is it the intention to bar him out?

Mr. THORESON. Will this bar municipal officers in cities of the third class being elected to the Legislature? If it does, it should be amended.

Mr. VAN HORNE. I think that would not bar officers under the authority of the State perhaps. That is a question for construction by the courts.

Mr. THORESON. Just as much so as school trustees?

Mr. VAN HORNE. I think they are not officers of the United States. He gets his certificate of election in a different way. A justice of the peace gets his certificate from the State at a general election. I do not think that comes under the authority of the State.

Mr. EICHNOR. I think every officer in the State of Utah holds an office under authority of this State_by virtue of the authority of the State of Utah, no matter whether it is directly or indirectly.

Mr. KIMBALL (Weber). Mr. President, I hope this amendment proposed by the gentleman from Salt Lake will not be adopted. If you follow out the doctrine announced by him, you will have to include here road supervisors, dog killers, and everybody else. Now, it has never been considered in any state that school trustees come within this prohibition. I venture to state, if you will look up all the constitutions in the United States, you will find that the exception stops with postmasters of the fourth class or postmasters whose salaries do not exceed four hundred dollars. If you follow out the logic you will never get through putting in amendments here.

Mr. EICHNOR. With the consent of my second, I will withdraw my amendment of the words “school trustee” and insert the words, “local officers.”

The amendment was rejected.

Mr. ANDERSON. Mr. President, I move as an amendment to this section that we strike out the words, “or of this State.” I think there are so many officers of the State that should be eligible to the Legislature.

Mr. EVANS (Weber). Then you would permit the governor, would you, the secretary, or any other officer of the State to sit in the Legislature, or members of a city council, sheriffs, collectors, or anything else?

Mr. ANDERSON. Yes, if the people elected them.

The amendment was rejected.

Mr. HART. Mr. President, it seems to me that the exception given in lines 6 and 7, namely, justices of the peace, comes within the objection made by Mr. Kimball, of Weber, to the amendment proposed sometime ago by Mr. Van Horne of Salt Lake. That exception seems to be upon the theory that “officers of the State” includes all officers, including local, precinct, and county officers. I move, therefore, Mr. President, that the words, “justice of the peace” be stricken out. I think the construction would then be as Mr. Kimball suggests, that “State officers” means officers of the State at large.

The question being taken on the amendment, the Convention divided, and by a vote of 33 ayes to 40 noes, the amendment was rejected.

Mr. HAMMOND. Mr. President, I am not in favor of this section, but it seems to be going through. These State officers that are to be supported by the taxpayers_I would like to see a provision that they should be freeholders.

The PRESIDENT. Will the gentleman make a motion? There is nothing before the house.

Mr. HAMMOND. If I could get a second, I would like to_

Mr. NEBEKER. I second the motion. [Laughter.]

Mr. HAMMOND. Now, San Juan is square on the floor.
{936}
The PRESIDENT. We haven't any motion.

Mr. HAMMOND. The suggestion was seconded. I make a motion, sir, that all the State officers that are supported by the taxes of the people, that they themselves shall be taxpayers and freeholders. In a country where land is cheap as it is here, it seems to me that all these officers at least might have a piece of land, if it was not any larger than sufficient to bury them upon or in. I have seen a great deal of this in my day. Office holders crying loudest for office pay but a very small tax, and I would like this to be provided.

Mr. VAN HORNE. I would ask Mr. Hammond if he has contemplated the fact that we passed in the declaration or bill of rights a provision that no property qualification should ever be required to vote or hold office?

Mr. HAMMOND. Yes.

Mr. VAN HORNE. Then I arise to a point of order that that could only be_

Mr. HAMMOND. Could not that be reconsidered, sir?

Mr. VAN HORNE. I arise to the point of order that that could only be by a reconsideration of

that article.

The PRESIDENT. The gentleman's point of order is well taken.

Mr. EVANS (Weber). I call Mr. Van Horne's attention to the fact that that article in the Constitution provides, “except as otherwise in this Constitution provided,” so that the gentleman from San Juan would be right now, if he wanted to make a motion.

The PRESIDENT. The gentleman will present his amendment in writing and we will entertain it.

Mr. VAN HORNE. I would ask if the provision of property qualification was not thoroughly gone over in the article on elections and rights of suffrage?

Mr. EVANS (Weber). It was gone over, but there was an exception made that there should be no property qualification, except as in this Constitution otherwise provided.

Mr. VAN HORNE. I ask about the elections and suffrage article. That did not go into that article.

Mr. EVANS ( Weber). The other provision did, however.

Mr. KIMBALL (Weber). The gentleman's amendment does not pertain to section 8 at all.
Sections 10, 13, 14 and 15 were read.

Mr. CORAY. Mr. President, I move to strike out the word “smaller,” in line 3, and substitute in place of it the word “less.”

The amendment was rejected.

Sections 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 were read.

Mr. BOYER. Mr. President, I move you to amend section 20 by striking out, in line two, the word “ninety,” and insert in place thereof the words “sixty-five.”

The amendment was rejected.

Mr. L. LARSON. Mr. President, I move that in line 3, section 20, the word “sixty” be stricken out and the word “fifty” inserted in lieu thereof.

The question being taken on the amendment, the Convention divided and by a vote of 3S ayes (noes not counted) the amendment was rejected.

Sections 21, 22 and 23 were read.

Mr. THORESON. Mr. President, I move to strike out the word “party,” in the seventh line, and insert the word “person.”

Section 24 was read.

Mr. THORESON. Mr. President, I would like to see this matter harmonized and for that reason I move that we strike out the word “person,” in the first line of said section, and insert the word “party.”

The amendment was rejected.

Sections 25, 26 and 27 were read.

Mr. SQUIRES, Mr. President, I move that a transposition be made in that section so that as amended it would read as follows:
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Except general appropriation bills and bills for the codification and general revision of laws, no bills shall be passed containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title.

Mr. VAN HORNE. I move that we pass section 31 until the end of the consideration of the other provisions of the article.

The motion was agreed to.

Sections 32 and 33 were read.

Mr. EICHNOR. Mr. President, I move to strike out section 33. It is a well known fact that the authorities of the United States have made war on lotteries, that it is the next thing to an impossibility to get a legislature to authorize the establishment of a lottery in the State of Utah. I know a number of states have that provision, but it is simply a dead letter. The United States would step in and punish every one connected with the affair. Not in the local matters, but as far as the mails are concerned. You could not use the mails for any purpose of that kind. I do not think that there is any danger that the State of Utah wants to establish lotteries, or authorize any one to establish a lottery.

Mr. BOWDLE. Mr. President, I am opposed to striking out that section. North Dakota adopted a constitution without any section pertaining to lotteries in it. I am informed by gentlemen who lived in the state at that time, that their first legislature was besieged during the whole of its time by the Louisiana lottery to try to get authority to operate in that state, notwithstanding the prohibition that is passed by the United States government, with reference to the use of the mails, and we do not want that trouble here. If we leave it in, it will be notice for them to keep hands off.

Mr. EICHNOR. Have you any idea that the Legislature of the State of Utah would in any way be

bamboozled into establishing a lottery?

Mr. BOWDLE. They might not be, but we can so easily prevent them being importuned to do it, let us take the opportunity and do it.

Mr. EICHNOR. In other words you believe in putting up a sign board?

Mr. BOWDLE. Yes, sir.

Mr. VAN HORNE. Mr. President, I hope that article will not go out. It is against the principle. I have heard in all my efforts to do anything with regard to this Constitution, “It is legislating in detail; it is limiting the power of the Legislature, and for that reason it is objectionable.” But we know by common report that there were a million and a half dollars in the hands of men besieging the legislature of North Dakota to grant the franchise for a lottery. A great deal has been said about the necessity of our putting guards around the Legislature for their future action in matters that have not the magnitude that that would have. It seems to me that it would be well to leave in the Constitution a prohibition against granting a franchise that common consent of the country holds to be an immoral franchise and detrimental to the public good. I hope the section will not be stricken out.

Mr. EVANS ( Weber). Mr. President, I am entirely opposed to the striking out of this section. There is no doubt but what if this section is stricken out there will be a combination of people who will importune our incoming Legislature for the purpose of securing a franchise to carry on lotteries and games of chance. I believe that such institutions are wrong in principle. I believe that we ought to put an inhibition upon the Legislature to permit a thing of this kind. My friend from Salt Lake says the Legislature cannot be bamboozled into granting such a franchise. I say let us make a prohibition in the Constitution so that they will not even consider the question at all. I {938} am opposed to the striking of it out and will vote against it.

Mr. HAMMOND. Let me ask the gentleman from Weber a question? Will this prohibit horse racing? I am very fond of horse racing. I never bet much on it, but I am fond of it.

Mr. EVANS (Weber), No; it will not according to the construction of the courts.

Mr. HAMMOND. Then I am satisfied.

Mr. VARIAN. Mr. President, and gentlemen, I hope this will not go out. We need just such a prohibition and the history of the times illustrates it. Many legislatures have attempted, even in the very teeth of the constitutional provision, to enact lottery schemes for the supposed benefit of the state. It is a prostitution of public functions that I do not think is legislation, either_a prohibition against a tendency of modern times, which is rapidly increasing.

The motion to strike out was rejected.

Section 34 was read.

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. President, when that section was adopted it was expressly stated that it followed the section that has just been read. That part of the section that has just been read is 34 in the printed article, but it will not be 34 in the article as revised, because other sections have been stricken out.

Section 35 was then read as follows:

The Legislature shall have no power to grant or to authorize any county or municipality authority to grant any extra compensation, fee, or allowance to any public officer, agent, servant, or contractor, after service has been rendered, or a contract has been entered into and performed in whole or in part, nor pay nor authorize the payment of any claim hereafter created against the State, or any county or municipality of the State. under any agreement or contract made without authority of law.

Mr. EVANS (Weber). Mr. President, I was not in the committee of the whole the other day when that section was adopted and I want to make a remark or two upon it. I cannot conceive why it is that any gentleman would oppose that section. There is certainly nothing in it of a political nature to begin with. The principle formulated in the section is one which ought to prevail in every well regulated government. It does not mean to prohibit the State from making a proper contract with any individual. It simply means to prohibit a contractor, after he has entered into a contract with the State or with any municipality, from applying to the Legislature or the city council for extra compensation after he has entered into his contract. The history of the United States is replete with just. such transactions as would occur in the new State were this provision not to prevail. We all know how ready men are to enter into contracts to perform public work. We all know how it is that they constantly importune the officers and the authority of the government for the purpose of securing the work, and then in the absence of any restriction in the law or in the Constitution, how ready they are to apply again the second time for extra compensation for that work which they had originally contracted to do for a designated price. Are we here just entering upon the threshold of a new State going to leave the door wide open for contractors, who in the first instance seek with alacrity contracts for the benefit of the State and of themselves and then turn around and say, “We desire extra compensation over and above that which we agreed in the first instance?” Gentlemen, you know how easy it is; take large improvements, take the building of a capitol, take the construction of a school building, of county court houses, or of any public building, men contract to put them up for a certain designated price. Men {939} give their bids for that purpose. Are we to to leave the door open and say now that when they have done that they can apply to the representatives of the people and receive compensation over and above that which they originally agreed to perform the work for?

And there is another mischief that is suggested by gentlemen here upon the right. If this thing be left open in the manner in which some gentlemen upon this floor intend to leave it, the contractor or bidder will bid a low figure in the first instance in the hope of getting the contract and thereby, after it is secured, in the further and additional hope and belief that he can apply to the

representatives of the people and increase the compensation which he originally contracted to perform the work for. I am somewhat surprised at the gentleman from Weber. I do not know why he should want to strike this out. He has had some experience in the city council, as city attorney, and knows the mischief that results from a want of just such restrictions as this section proposes. We have had instances in Ogden where people have performed public work upon the sewers and where they have received warrants for their compensation, and who have applied to the city council after they had sold their warrants at a discount to make up the additional amount so that the warrants might be of their face value. The city council has performed work of this kind. Is it right that it should do it? Shall we leave the door entirely open so that when a man in the first instance secures his contract, that he can come in under some false pretense for the purpose of reaching his hand in the public treasury and replenishing his own pocket by saying to the people, “I was mistaken when I made the first contract, I did not get enough; I want another whack at the public treasury?” These things have been too frequent in the history of our country. And gentlemen, it is not a political question. Let us put a quietus upon that method, writing in the Constitution which we are here forming, so that that thing shall forever be prohibited, and when men enter into their contracts, let them be careful in the first instance.

Mr. CANNON. I would like to ask, in case some work' was under construction_the building of a bridge, we will say, or something of that character, and they had designed to make it with certain kind of footings, for instance, and afterwards the nature of the soil was proved to be such that it would not be advisable so to do. Under this clause could the contractor receive extra compensation for work which was really a benefit or not, or would he not be prohibited from doing that?

Mr. EVANS ( Weber). I would say that the shrewd contractor in contracting with the State would classify his work. He would make certain classifications, so that if the surface of the ground were softer than that which underlies it, if he came into hardpan, or cement, there would be a classification for which he would receive extra compensation, but this section that I object to goes beyond all that. It permits people entering into these contracts to apply again for extra compensation.

Mr. CANNON. The gentleman does not comprehend my meaning.

It would be simply this: Not for a difference of material which the contractor might have to get, but in case it was necessary to change for any reason the plan, would that be permitted even if it were for the public good, by this clause? If this clause goes in, would that permit a change where it was apparent and for the public good?

Mr. EVANS (Weber). If I understand you right, you mean that where something would be encountered which could not be discovered at the time of making the contract?

Mr. CANNON. Yes, sir.
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Mr. EVANS ( Weber). I do not understand that there is anything in this section that would preclude a contract being made under circumstances of that kind, but it is to preclude this extra

compensation which people are habitually applying for.

Mr. SQUIRES. I would like to ask the gentleman one question. In the case that you referred to, where a contract was taken for the city of Ogden, and men had received their pay in warrants, which, in order to be converted into money, had to be sold at a discount, do you think that would be perfectly fair treatment to the contractor? He contracts for a cash price and is paid in a kind of paper which requires him to discount perhaps ten per cent, would not it be right that that amount should be made good?

Mr. EVANS (Weber). Certainly he should have his money. He should have his contract price, but he should not accept city warrants in lieu of money and then apply to the city council again and receive an additional number of warrants. If the additional amount be five thousand dollars over and above the contracts, it cost the city five thousand dollars more than the original contract and that is the thing I am objecting to. Of course, I believe a man should be paid his money, but I should say he should be paid no more.

Mr. KIMBALL (Weber). If the contract was for so much cash at the time payment was made, they paid in city warrants that were only worth eighty per cent in the market, the city council, on application of the contractor, issued warrants to the amount of twenty per cent more than the face of the contract price, still the contractor would only get his contract price, wouldn't he?

Mr. EVANS (Weber). The city had to pay five thousand dollars additional, did it not?

Mr. KIMBALL (Weber). No, sir; it did not.

Mr. EVANS (Weber). Whatever the amount was?

Mr. KIMBALL (Weber). When the warrants became payable it may cost the city five thousand dollars more, but at the time the payment was made they only paid the contractor ten per cent or twenty per cent less than his contract price.

Mr. EVANS ( Weber). No, I say right now, and I have said it right along, that the action of the city council was unlawful, unjust, and ought not to have been taken.

Mr. GOODWIN. I want to ask Mr. Evans how would this affect any business of the city council? This has relation entirely to the Legislature.

Mr. EVANS (Weber). It expressly provides for it. It has an expressed limitation upon the cities and the counties and the Legislature shall not authorize it. These municipalities are creatures of the Legislature, and unless they receive their power from the Legislature they cannot act, and this is a limitation upon them. It seems to me that we have had lessons enough right in our own midst. I do not care to specify them. I only specify one instance_to teach us a lesson in this respect and to put in this prohibition.

Mr. SQUIRES. Mr. President, I have in mind a case in this very county where the the county

collector needed a thousand dollars' worth of two cent stamped envelopes in order to transact properly the business of his department. He called upon the county court for an appropriation of these stamps. The envelopes were ordered at Washington. When they came here to the postmaster the postmaster declined to deliver them without the cash. The county had no cash to pay, and before they could secure those stamped envelopes, which were worth eleven hundred dollars, I think, they were obliged to give a warrant for eleven hundred and fifty dollars to get the cash to pay the postmaster, who would not accept any warrants, of {941} course. The year following the county assessor here went to the county court for an appropriation for stamps and they told him to go ahead and order the stamps and they would give him a warrant. He did so, and had to discount the warrant. He had to pay cash for the stamps and had to discount the warrant ten per cent. in order to get his money back. Now, I do not believe we should put any such burden as that upon an official who is performing the public duties of the county. That is the condition of this county to-day. The county officers need the facilities for transacting their business. The county court has no money. They have to pay cash for those articles and the only way they can remunerate themselves is by county warrants. County warrants are liable to run for three years, and of course they are subject to a discount, and I do not believe it is right to expect an official to expend his own money and then accept warrants at ten per cent discount in payment thereof.

Mr. EVANS ( Weber). Should a county or municipality make contracts when they have not any money to pay for them?

Mr. SQUIRES. I am referring to the actual necessities of this county. It is necessary that these sums should be procured here in order to assess and collect the taxes of the county so that the county may go on with its business.

Mr. RICHARDS. What is there in this section that would prevent the county court in a transaction of that kind from appropriating the actual value of the envelopes?

Mr. SQUIRES. Nothing, except that they did not have the cash and had to pay in warrants.

Mr. RICHARDS. What was the objection then to issuing sufficient warrants to pay for the stamps?

Mr. SQUIRES. That question was answered by Mr. Evans himself. He can answer you.

Mr. RICHARDS. I see nothing in this section which would prevent it, Mr. President.

Mr. SQUIRES. I will answer the gentleman's question. When Mr. Lynch, this county assessor of ours, having accepted, as he had to, a warrant in payment of the eighty odd dollars cash that he expended for postage stamps, comes to the county court and asks for an appropriation sufficient to pay him the discount which he had to make on his: warrants; he would be prohibited under this act from receiving it from the county court.

Mr. RICHARDS. My answer to that would be this: that Mr. Lynch ought not to have accepted

the eighty dollars in payment.

Mr. SQUIRES. No, he ought to wait three years for it.

Mr. RICHARDS. He ought to have accepted what would be equivalent to it.

Mr. VAN HORNE. Mr. President, it is possible that this provision might be amended so as to have no objectionable features. I do not know about that. As it is, it seems to me, it has some very objectionable features. In the first place, it seems to me, that it is objectionable in the line of an objection that has frequently been made here, that it is unnecessarily limiting the power of the Legislature. It is legislation as to what they shall or shall not do. That is a minor objection, however. If that is legislation_where there is any doubt about it, it seems to me clearly that it should not go into the Constitution. It does seem to me that there is a doubt about this provision, and a very grave doubt. For instance, it does not allow the appropriation to be made for an extra contract service. If a man has a contract and performs a service outside of the contract, he has not even an implied right to ask that the value of his service be given to him. Another thing is, that if he is a contractor, and it becomes necessary to do anything that is {942} for the public good on a sudden emergency of any kind, if he performed that service and expended his own means and time in doing it, under this provision he could not even present a claim to the State or to the municipality for the service he had rendered.

Mr. EVANS (Weber). Do you say that a contractor should be the judge of the expediency of that question?

Mr. VAN HORNE. I say that in cases of emergency he should be the judge to the extent, not of compelling the State or city to pay, but to render the service if necessary, and say, “Here is my service rendered, you can look at it, if it is worth anything, gfve it to me.”

Mr. EVANS (Weber). Do not. these contractors usually find it expedient to say something of that kind in order to get extra compensation?

Mr. VAN HORNE. I do not know. The gentleman may have had more experience with contractors than I have, and for that reason he may insist upon it being put in. I do not know whether contractors usually do anything of the sort or no, but I was simply stating the proposition that a service inky be justly and properly rendered and that this provision prevents the recompense for an extra contractual service. Again, with regard to the compensation, fee, or allowance to officers. I do not know that such a case would happen, it may never happen, but suppose an officer, who is an officer of the State, for the performance of certain duties by some emergency, for some reason or other is called upon to perform a duty for the State that is for the benefit in his judgment of the State and of the people of the State. He performs that duty in good faith. To be sure, gentlemen, he has no right to say what that is worth, but here you say you are sure that we should say that the Legislature should never say it was worth something to the State and give him a recompense for it. Again, we will take the additional case, suppose a case of invasion or rebellion in this State, suppose the militia was out and it became necessary for them in the support of their movements to take some cattle that were on the range and kill them for the

support of the soldiers of the commonwealth. They did. not find the owner of the cattle at the time; he found out afterwards that the State authorities had taken his property in that way and he presented a claim to the State for them; would it be just to say, not that he should fix the value of everything that was taken or damage that was done W them or the benefit to the State, but that he should receive no compensation whatever for the damage that was done to him by the State officials acting without authority of law and without contract? Again, take the case of a citizen_

Mr. EVANS (Weber). I would like to know what analogy you find between the illustration you make and the section which we are now considering_that is for service rendered or contract to be entered into, or performed, in whole or in part. That is the subject matter of the section. You are giving a case of necessity_a case of emergency where no contract is made.

Mr. VAN HORNE. Must your contract be an express contract?

Mr. EVANS (Weber). No, there would be no contract at all in the case which you have mentioned.

Mr. VAN HORNE. Take another case. Suppose a man performs a duty to the commonwealth as an officer of the State. We will presume a case here, that in the act of a fire department in this city_the occupants of this building having the public records and so on, one of them would find that it was necessary to expend money, and that by the expenditure of money by himself, he would perform a service to the State in saving the records, and he assumed that “this is a patriotic duty to save them if I can. I will go to work {943} and expend this money. I will be a guaranty to the men who work here under my direction that I will pay them for it,” and he does the work and pays the men, Ought we to say he should not present any claim at all for the matter, because he is an officer of the State? It seems to me that when there are these doubts about the propriety of this thing, either the section should be amended, so as to cover the exceptional cases, or else it should not be passed.

Mr. THORESON. I would like to ask a question. If you construe this section so as to prohibit a city or a county or even a state from paying any just debt?

Mr. VAN HORNE. I think that it might be so construed; yes, sir; very readily.

Mr. THORESON. I think not; it provides here, “without authority of law.” Would that prohibit the Legislature from paying that claim?

Mr. VAN HORNE. It seems to me that if there was what you would call an implied contract for the service and there was no express authority of law for his having performed the service, that the contract would be based upon the absence of the authority and that it would be under those circumstances a contract without authority of law_the very point I was getting at, I thought stating the matter clearly. If I am mistaken about that_if the gentlemen are sure that the courts would not construe it in such a fashion as that, there might not be the same objection to the section.

Mr. VAN HORNE. Will the gentleman allow me to correct him? I stated the point exactly that, that it says no extra compensation, fee, or allowance, to any public officer, agent, servant, or contractor, after service has been rendered. Now, the objection that I have to that is, that it does not define the service must' be within the ordinary scope of his duties; that something outside of that, if it was done, he would make no claim for it, or no compensation could be granted.

Mr. RICHARDS. I do not understand the matter any differently now from what I did before. I still think that the chairman of the committee is under a misapprehension. I understand that this relates only to extra compensation that has grown out of a contract. Now, the very case that the gentleman suggests contemplates no contract. That is the point I desire to make, and that is the distinction all the way through. In the militia illustration, there was no contract there, not even an implied contract. If an officer of the State goes out and takes the property of an individual, is there any implied contract in that? It is in the nature of a tort. It is not a matter of contract whatever. Therefore, it has no application. If a man makes a contract and then in the course of this contract it is found necessary to change the work that is to be done and the parties {944} modify that contract, that could be done under the provisions of this section, beyond any question, but this is the thing that cannot be done, under this section, and the thing that ought not to be done, and the very thing that I am informed has been done more than once in this city and in this county and in other parts of this Territory. Men have entered into contracts, have made their bids in competition with other men, who are in the same business; by bidding below these other men they have obtained the contract and then they have asked for an additional compensation. For what? For filling that contract. This provision says they cannot do it, but if they render extra service to the city or the county or the State, nothing in this section prevents them from having pay for that extra service.

Mr. EVANS (Weber). it prevents them, after the service has been performed.

Mr. RICHARDS. It prevents them from making a contract and then, under the pretense of filling that contract, coming in afterwards and saying, “I have incurred certain additional expense and I want to be paid that.” This is what devolves upon them under such circumstances. In the first place the duty devolves upon them to fulfill the contract that they may have made for the contract price. And if they propose to vary that contract, to change the work that is to be done, to increase the expense to the public, then the duty devolves upon them to change that contract or modify it

to an extent that they will be able to recover compensation for it. Now, it seems to me, that that is absolutely just and right. I do not see how any man on this floor can object to a proposition of that kind. And not one of the illustrations presented here is in point, as I understand it. Take, for instance, the public officer. As the gentleman says, a public officer is performing certain duties and he has a certain salary, but an emergency arises and he is required to perform other duties.

Now, if the duty that he has to perform is occasioned by or is in the line of the office or duty of the office, that he is undertaking, then I say that man should perform that duty, because he has undertaken to do it and he should receive no extra compensation for it, because when he took that office, he took it with the duties and the burdens as well as with the honors and emoluments attaching to it, and if any thing should happen in the regular administration of the duties of his office that would lessen the burdens of that office could the State come back on him and say, “We will decrease your salary in proportion to the decrease of labor?” No. Then, if the legitimate services and duty that he had performed in the office are increased, he takes that burden as I have said before, as he takes the honors and emoluments; but suppose an emergency arises and he has performed duties outside of his office, is there anything that prevents him from going and asking compensation for it? No, because he has made no contract to perform that duty or do that work. He has contracted to perform the duties of his office for a certain sum, and this constitutional provision would compel him to abide by his contract, but when he went outside and did other duties, the State would be liable for it and that would be proper, just as in the case of the contractor, where the man had made the contract, he should be compelled to fill the contract according to his agreement and without additional compensation, but if a variance of the contract is made between the parties_if a change occurs by which it cost him more, then that would be a modification of the contract and on that he could recover.

So, gentlemen, I cannot see any possible injury that could happen by reason of the adoption of this section, but {945} I can see a great good that would result from it. I can see how legislatures, how city councils, county courts, executive officers, men who have public work to do, men who advertise for public work, can be protected and how the State and the municipalities can be protected and prevented from the perpetration of frauds by reason of men coming in and bidding below what they can do the work for in the hope that after it is done they can come forward and get a bonus. Whenever that is done, then the advantage of public competition is absolutely denied and done away with. Everybody knows that' if bids are out here to-day for a certain public work to be performed for this city, and men could come in and make their bids honestly, the lowest responsible bidder presumably will have the work to do and he should do it for the price he agrees to do it for.

Mr. JAMES. May I ask Mr. Richards a question? I have been trying ever since you introduced the amendment yesterday to get the correct scope of that provision and understand it, and if I understand it correctly, as I said yesterday and as you stated, I should favor it. I want to ask this question: we have a building that we are in at the present time. There was a contract for its erection at the time I was a member of the city council. The contract with the builders of this building was three hundred and seventy or three hundred and seventy-five thousand dollars, I do not remember which. The building was finally completed at a cost to this city of about eight hundred thousand dollars. Now, I want to know if your provision is one that is intended to protect

the people from such an additional cost as was put upon this building, over what was intended should be put upon it at the beginning?

Mr. RICHARDS. Yes, sir; if this building was built on the same plan that was originally proposed, it is to prevent that very thing. That is exactly what it is to prevent. It is to prevent a man from coming in and making a bid for any public work, I do not care what it is, for less than he can afford to do it for, in order that he may get the work, and then after he has done it, if he has friends enough in the power that makes the appropriation, no matter whether it be a city council, a county court, or a legislature_to prevent that man from taking the contract for less than he can do it for, and then afterwards come in and get a bonus, and get paid and remunerated for what he has done and for as much more as his friends may see fit to give him. It is to place these matters in such a shape that when we have competition for public work it will be honest competition; that is what it is for. That when a man bids on any public work, no matter what it may be, that he may know that if he makes an honest bid, he will stand on an equal footing with every other bidder, and if a man comes in and underbids him, and agrees to perform that work and enters into a contract to do it for less than it costs, that man will suffer the loss and not the public. Now, I am putting it only on the charitable side. I am not assuming that there is going to be any jobbery or any intention of jobbery, but if there is, this is intended to cut it off. I want to tell you that right now. It is to prevent any possibility of jobbery of any kind. That is the purpose of this amendment, but I do not understand that there is one word or one syllable in this section that would prevent any man from recovering an honest compensation for any work that he might do for the public. That is, assuming, of course, that he did it under proper authority. I do not know that this would authorize a man to go and volunteer to do certain things without any authority to do them, but any work that is done for the public by proper authority can be compensated under this article. And yet, when a man makes a contract, {946} he has got to stand by it, whether he is a public officer or a private contractor.

Mr. IVINS. Mr. President, there appears to me from the arguments, particularly those of the gentleman from Salt Lake, Mr. Van Horne, that there is a misapprehensien as to the intent of this proposed amendment. It seems to me further from the reply that the gentleman who just spoke made to Mr. James' question. Now, I do not understand that if, under the contract by
which this building was constructed, there should have been a change in its plans and specifications by which a greater outlay became necessary, that the city or county would be debarred from meeting that extra expense, but if the building was contracted for, and built according to the plans and specifications under which the contract was made and then there was a deficit, the contractor himself would meet it. It is not intended to cover any one of the different points to which the gentleman from Salt Lake, Mr. Van Horne, referred in his argument. His hypothesis was not properly based at all. Extra compensation will always be done to the State and to the city, and there is nothing in this provision that would prevent the compensation for that extra labor that would be necessary. It simply means this, that when men contract to do a certain piece of work, if they do it according to the plans and specifications, they will be paid just what the contract provides for and nothing more nor less. But if in the course of construction of that labor, as was referred to by the gentleman from Piute_if in constructing a bridge under contract, it became evident before the bridge was completed that there must be a change in the plans and specifications, and a different kind of a bridge was to be constructed, there would be nothing in

this provision that would prevent payment of an additional sum to the contractor, but he must first have that plan_that extra expense which would be necessary, laid before the same body that authorized the original contract, and have the change approved by them and not be permitted to go on and make those changes upon his own responsibility or his own account. Now, that is the way I understand this question. If I am wrong, I should like to be corrected, because, as I understand it, it seems to me to be a very necessary provision to go into this Constitution. I do not believe it is right to leave it open for anybody, whether it be municipal, county, or State, after having contracted a certain piece of work at a certain price, to pay any more than that contract price, unless there shall have been an additional expense incurred because of a change in the plans and specifications. I think that is all it means, and I think that the section should go into the Constitution.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. President, I found in my experience there are two sides to a question at all times. I have no objection in regard to contracts_being a contractor all my life_whenever a contract is made to carry that contract through. If there is any change made, there is generally a proviso made for the change and a new understanding entered into. There may be instances where they cannot meet to make them. In that instance then the contractor will use his best judgment for the benefit of those who are employing him, but the objections that I have are in the kind of payments. I had a contract on this very building and I received forty-eight thousand dollars in scrip where it ought to be cash down, and we made a protest against that kind of pay, for the contract was cash, and they say, “We cannot help it; you cannot force it. You can throw the job up if you are a mind to, but we will build it at your expense.” We could go to a lawsuit with them, but we had no protection as contractors, for the kind of pay that they were to pay us, hence, I want something on that side of the question. {947} We have come here to form a Constitution, and protection, not only for the cities and counties and State, but we come here to make a protection for the workingman_the contractors, the farmers, and all that are interested in their deals and transactions with the State, city, or county. I had the same experience again on a contract on this sewer. Most of you living in this city know When the city failed they had not a cent in the treasury; they demanded us to go on with the contract, for we had made a contract for that, but the kind of pay_that was out of the question, and I believe that there should be some protection for the workingman and contractors and others, as well as protection for the State, city, and county.

Mr. RALEIGH. I would like to ask Mr. Morris a question. Was there any thing requiring you to go on and fill your contract after the city had violated it on their part? If they did not pay you according to the conditions of the contract, were you under any obligation to go on?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, according to the advise of legal men, we thought we had better go on and complete our contract and then bring suit against the city.

Mr. RALEIGH. But they were also under obligations to fulfill their part of the contract too?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, but they were the biggest and the strongest and we were the weakest.

Mr. VARIAN. Mr. President, since the motion is to strike out the entire section, the effect of that

motion will be, if not carried, to preclude any amendments to the section. It will then, be the judgment of the house that it stand as it is. I desire to offer an amendment at the end of the section to meet a suggestion that occurs to me relative to public officers. Particularly I have in mind officers who are entrusted with the execution of the criminal law. Take a sheriff for instance, he might be called upon to pursue a felon out of the State where the trail was warm, as you might say. He might be put to the expenditure of a great deal of money, as well as time in following a criminal across one or more states. In order to make it clear that under such circumstances the Legislature shall have the power to reimburse him, I offer this amendment:

Provided this section shall not apply to claims incurred by public officers in the execution of the laws of the State.

Mr. RICHARDS. I accept the amendment.

Mr. VARIAN. The illustration made in relation to the militia, it seems to me does not apply, nor does it fairly illustrate the purpose and design of this section as I read it. The executive would only have the authority to call out the militia in a case authorized by law. Of necessity the law would authorize, either expressly or by implication as a necessary incident to the action of the militia under the authority of the executive acting by law, to make all necessary contracts for the support of that body while in the field or while in the execution of its duties. I agree with the gentleman, my colleague from Salt Lake (Mr. Richards), that there ought to be something like this in this Constitution.

Mr. BUTTON. If your amendment came after “part”, on the 7th line, would not it cover just what it does now?

Mr. VARIAN. I do not desire to strike out the clause prohibiting allowance of claims unauthorized by law as a general proposition. The Legislature may come in and make a provision for an unauthorized claim and I do not think that that is good public policy. I believe in that prohibition. I believe in it as far as at present advised {948} and I submit the amendment that I offered at the end of the section.

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, there is no doubt that this in some instances would prove a benefit. In others it would be a defect. In the question I brought up yesterday_the question was asked by Mr. Richards, and also the gentleman from Washington this morning referred to it, take these outside couuties where there are no railroads, mail runs once or twice a week, and there is two or three hundred miles long_say 150 miles at any rate, and it is necessary to do some road work and there is a contract let. The county court know nothing about that. They will take likely the word of the supervisor or send some man to investigate. Then they draw up this contract to the best of their judgment. The man takes the contract to do the work. When he gets the work partly done, he finds that by putting fifty or a hundred dollars' worth more of work on that job it would be a good job, and without it it would not. Now, they say, “Well, you must go before the county court and get your contract modified;” these points cannot all be provided for in a contract, because

you do not know what it is in the beginning. The man says to himself, “It will take me at least three weeks and a week's time of my own labor to see these men, get them together, and get a new contract,” which is the case. Now, the county court would be obliged to get together to consider this matter and you can reckon up the cost of that court getting together, and it would cost from fifty to a hundred dollars to consider this question. Well, the man will say to himself, “I do not care, I will do as I have agreed to do and if the job is no good, why, it is nothing to inc.” Or, if he takes the other course, it will cost as much to get the county court together as it would to perform the labor and render a bill thereafter, and in that instance it would work a hardship, and it might be in the fall of the year; whereas, putting it off to get this contract modified, the job would have to lay over another season. Many cases of this kind have come up.

Mr. THORESON. I would like to ask the gentleman a question. You would infer at least that road supervisors in certain counites are allowed to make contracts for the county without the authority of county courts is that a fact?

Mr. ALLEN. No, sir; I said the county court will talk first with the supervisor as to what kind of a bridge will be necessary, therefore, they would be acting honestly on his word.

Mr. THORESON. Wouldn't they then authorize him to go ahead and do the work?

Mr. ALLEN. The contractor would have the job. In order to get the contract modified, he would have to see the court and get them together.

Mr. RICHARDS. Let me ask you a question. Now, it seems to me that the gentleman has a misapprehension of this matter or else I have. Now, in the very case the gentleman illustrates, as to the case of the bridge, I understand the proposition to be that the contractor, instead of building the bridge the way he contracted to build it, becomes satisfied that the benefit of the county requires that the bridge should be constructed in a different manner and he goes on and constructs it in that manner and then the question is if he did that, whether he could be paid under this constitutional provision, is that right?

Mr. ALLEN. The way I understood you, he was not to be paid for that, unless he got the contract modified.

Mr. RICHARDS. I will state it again. The man enters into a contract to build a bridge, in a certain way. Now, at a certain time in the progress of the work he comes to the conclusion that it would be for the benefit of the county to {949} change the manner of constructing that bridge and make a different kind of a bridge and he constructed it accordingly. Now, then, the question that you asked or as I understood the question to be, was whether, under this constitutional provision, the county court could accept that and pay him for it. Is that the point?

Mr. ALLEN. I understand from this that they could not pay him if he did the work before he changed the contract, and I understood you to so fix it.

Mr. RICHARDS. No, that is where you misapprehend my statement. I say this, that if the man

made a contract to build the bridge in a certain way and then he afterwards built another kind of a bridge, it would be optional with the county court whether they accepted the bridge at all or not, because he has not filled his contract, but the county court would have it in their power probably to accept of the bridge that he did build, if they were satisfied that the good of the county required that kind of a bridge, or that change, that I believe they would have power to do.

Mr. ALLEN. They could accept the bridge, but they could not pay him?

Mr. RICHARDS, Yes, sir; if they did accept the bridge they could pay him for it, because he is not asking an extra compensation for building the kind of a bridge he contracted to build. He is building another kind of bridge and he is asking pay for it.

Mr. ALLEN. I will ask you a question. Provided he built the same kind of a bridge, but put a little additional labor to it_a little additional expense then, what would be the result?

Mr. RICHARDS. If he enters into a contract to build a certain bridge and he builds that bridge, he would have no claim for any additional compensation, but if he built another kind of a bridge, then it is optional with the county court whether they accept that as fulfillment of his contract or not.

Mr. ALLEN. That is a very small point, but suppose, as I said, that he found it necessary to put more labor on the bridge, in order to make it what they would desire, and what it ought to be, and what he knew it ought to be, could he get paid for that extra work, without having his contract remodelled [*note*]?

Mr. RICHARDS. My opinion is that, if the county were satisfied that that change in the plan of the bridge was necessary and that the extra work that he performed was necessary to the county, that they could ratify that contract; that is, they could make it the same as if they had modified the contract before he did the work, so far as that is concerned.

Mr. ALLEN. All the gentlemen that spoke here this morning have talked right to the reverse of what you now say.

Mr. RICHARDS. I have not understood it so. As I said before, and I would like to reiterate what my position is on this matter, that if a person makes a contract to do a certain thing_

Mr. THURMAN. Mr. President, I arise for information. I would like to know where is that bridge?

Mr. ALLEN. I will say, Mr. Thurman, bridges of this kind and questions of this kind have come up that I know of and have had deals with and no doubt will come up in the future.

Mr. EVANS (Weber). I will answer Mr. Thurman by saying that the bridge is the section proposed which, if adopted, will carry us safely over.

Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, I see {950} nothing in this section of a partisan character. The only point I was opposed to is the fact that under some circumstances, I thought it would be for the public good to modify a contract and with a desire to correct that, I desire to propose an amendment after the word “part,” in line 7, as follows:

Unless amended contract be entered into after similar competition to that under which the original contract was awarded, the condition of the work at the time such amended contract becomes necessary being duly considered.

The amendment offered by Mr. Varian was agreed to.

Mr. EVANS (Weber). I just want to ask Mr. Varian a question. Do you not think that your amendment would permit officers to come in and receive extra fees and compensation?

Mr. VARIAN. No.

Mr. EVANS ( Weber). And do you think that such an instance as you give would be an extra fee or compensation under this provision, as it now stands?

Mr. VARIAN. I do not think, Mr. President, it applies at all to the case of fees for officers.

Mr. VAN HORNE. Mr. President, I think it is proper to get a section into the best condition possible before we take a vote on striking it out, and I have an amendment to propose for the lines reading down to line 7:

The Legislature shall have no power to grant or to authorize any county or municipal authority to grant any extra compensation, fee, or allowance, to any public officer, agent or servant, for the performance of the duties of his office, or employment, after such duty has been performed, nor to any contractor, after the contract has been entered into, or performed in whole or in part.

The substitute was rejected.

The roll being called on the motion to strike out the section, the result was as follows:

NOES_57.
Adams
Anderson
Barnes
Bowdle
Boyer

ABSENT_12.
Crane
Driver
Kerr
Mackintosh
Murdock, Wasatch
Nebeker
Pierce
Preston
Ricks
Snow
Thatcher
Thorne.

The president declared the motion lost. On motion, the Convention then took a recess until 2 o'clock p. m.

AFTERNOON SESSION.

Mr. VARIAN. Mr. President, I desire to offer an additional section to this article, which would be section 36. The same was read as follows:

Section 36. The Legislature shall not authorize the State, nor any county, city, township, district, or other political subdivision of the State, to lend its credit or subscribe stock or bonds in aid of any railroad, telegraph, or other private, individual, or corporate enterprise, or undertaking.

No appropriation shall be made by this State nor any political subdivision thereof to any person, corporation, association, or institution, not under the absolute control of the State, nor shall the State or any political subdivision thereof give, lend or pledge its credit for any such person, corporation, association, or institution.

Mr. VARIAN. Mr. President, there is a wide difference between the two propositions, and as I apprehend the substitute offered by my friend from Salt Lake County is intended to revive the

matter that was supposed to be disposed of yesterday, I do not care to enter upon that discussion, because the discussion on yesterday was profitless, and certainly whatever good purpose may have been subserved by it, none can be subserved by prolonging that discussion. I simply invite the attention of the Convention to the manifest design and purpose of this substitute, following which I shall point out wherein I think the section offered by myself is proper. The purpose of my section is to prohibit the lending of the credit in any way for the furtherance of such enterprises as are indicated. It is not intended to and does not directly or indirectly disturb the general power of the Legislature concerning general legislation of the State. It simply provides that the State shall not and no county or other political subdivision of the State shall subscribe to stock or bonds or lend its credit in aid of telegraph, railroad, or other enterprises of like character. The distinction between the two articles is manifest, and for one, I do not purpose to discuss that difference. I entertain very pronounced convictions upon the subject matter of the section offered by myself, but they are convictions that I presume others have on the same subject one way or the other, and it is not probable that the views of the members could be changed by a discussion and I am content to submit the section upon its merits.

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. President, I would like to say in reference to offering this substitute_     
Mr. CORAY. Mr. President, I object to the consideration of that substitute on the ground that it has been gone over_the principle part of it was gone over yesterday, and debated here for a whole day.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I arise to a point of order. The gentleman is altogether out of order for the reason that the only consideration of the substitute was had in the committee of the whole and not in the Convention.
{952}
The PRESIDENT. The point of order of Mr. Roberts is well taken.

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. President, I desire, in support of the substitute that I offer, to say that it is not presented for the purpose of opening up the discussion that was gone over yesterday. As far as I am concerned, I am willing to take a vote upon this section at once. I understand it is a proper section to offer as a substitue [*note*]. It goes as Mr. Varian says, not only to the extent of his section that he proposed, but even further, and, therefore, it is properly a substitute. If acted upon by the Convention and it should not prevail, then the section that he offers might prevail.

Mr. VARIAN. Do you think that the matter in your substitute covers all the ground in my section? Could not they both stand together, provided the Convention adopted them? Would you exclude the matter in mine because of what is in yours?

Mr. RICHARDS. Yes, sir; that is my understanding of it. I believe that the substitute that I offer is sufficiently broad to include all that is contained in the section that you offer and to cover more ground, and I am willing to take a vote at any time upon the subject,

Mr. KIMBALL (Weber). Mr. President, I would like to call the attention of the house to this matter. We spent considerable time yesterday in committee of the whole discussing section 1, as

contained in the report of the minority of the committee on legislative, and altogether upon the report made by them, we spent the whole day in the committee of the whole. After considerable discussion, section 1 was entirely rejected by that committee and the article reported back to this house with the recommendation that the article be adopted as reported. Now, the substitute offered by the gentleman from Salt Lake (Mr. Richards), is simply a reiteration of sections 1 and 2 of that report, except clothed in different language. The object of the substitute is to forbid the Legislature from granting bounties in favor of manufacturing or other industries in this Territory. That is the same thing that was discussed here yesterday and the same thing that was acted upon.

Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, I would like to have both of these read. I am opposed to them both.

Mr. EVANS (Weber). Mr. President, this matter was discussed on yesterday very thoroughly and I do not desire to take up much more time upon it. I was not here yesterday, and if permitted, I would like to make a few remarks. I want to say, gentlemen of the Convenvention [*note*], that so far as I am individually concerned, I would very much prefer to support the substitute offered by the gentleman from Salt Lake (Mr. Richards), but if that be not accepted by this Convention, I shall vote for the substitute offered by Mr. Varian. If there be a disposition in this Convention to keep out of the Constitution this provision in one form or another, I think I need not fear to predict that dire results will follow. It is the modern trend of constitution making to prohibit the state, county, and municipality from loaning its credit in aid of any private corporation. The history of the United States has fully demonstrated the wisdom of such provision.

It is useless to say that if our Constitution be left so open that private enterprises and corporations can organize and apply to the State through its officials and representatives for aid, that a great abuse of power will naturally follow. I think we ought to consider this matter in the light of non- partisanship in its truest sense we know as citizens of the new commonwealth, that if this matter be not guarded, if no restriction whatever be placed in the Constitution respecting this subject, there will be many abuses follow. Combinations of individuals {953} will organize. Trusts will be formed for the expressed purpose of securing from the public treasury the money which is drawn by way of enforced taxation from the great body of the people. We have every reason to believe_in fact, we ought to know it, in the light of past experience, that whenever an avenue be left open so that unscrupulous or shrewd business men can get together and organize and in the Interests of their own business secure the aid of the State, it will be done. Just so sure as this question is not guarded, just so sure will the public treasury be depleted by organizations of the character I have mentioned. What is loaning the credit of a state or a county or a municipality? In short, it means that if any corporation or enterprise desiring to start a business and for the purpose of aiding it, the State endorses or rather guarantees the bond or the paper of such individual or corporation_in the first instance, it may be considered perfectly harmless. It may be reasoned that it would develop enterprises and the latent resources of our new State to permit the State to loan its credit or to guarantee bonds for the purpose of starting these enterprises, and it might also be reasoned that those enterprises would pay the bonds or other obligations and the burden would never rest upon the State. But has history demonstrated that to be true? Surely it has not, but even if it has, the principle itself is wrong. It will not do in governments such as we have to engage or join hands with the individual in the enterprises of the individual. There should

be entire and complete segregation between the public interests and business and that of the individual interests and business. We will find_and I will predict it now, gentlemen, if one or the other of these substitutes does not go into this Constitution, we will find that as soon as we enter upon the threshold of statehood, as soon as we secure it, and as soon as it is organized and the Legislature meets, we will find combinations of wealth and we will find trusts, applying to the Legislature in order to aid and establish their industries, to loan them the credit of the State for this purpose, and we will find it to be true also in the future that the State will bear the burdens, because many people will organize for the purpose of carrying on what they believe to be industries for the welfare of the people, they will find failures in their business and the State will have to assume and pay the obligation, by reason of their endorsement or guaranty of these bonds. It is just as sure to come in this Territory as it has elsewhere. It is just as sure to bring financial ruin upon this people as that we fail to restrict it in this Constitution. Gentlemen upon the other side, think as you please with respect to the question of bounties, and differ as you may with us of the minority, yet upon this question now before this Convention can we not honestly and candidly join hands in seeing to it that the business of the State shall be separate from that of the individual?

Mr. KIMBALL (Weber). Why is it then, that you gentlemen on your side did not introduce a substitute, leaving out the question of bounties that was discussed all day yesterday?

Mr. EVANS (Weber). I was not here yesterday.

Mr. KIMBALL ( Weber). The gentleman who prepared the substitute was.

Mr. EVANS (Weber). That is all right. I stand by my colleagues so far as I am concerned, and if I had been here, I should have urged it more.

Mr. CANNON. Will the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. EVANS ( Weber). Yes, sir.

Mr. CANNON. I understand that in 1892, you were a member of the Legislature, and if my memory serves me correctly, you voted or spoke in favor of a {954} bounty to the Utah sugar factory. If that be true    

Mr. EVANS (Weber). Before you go any farther, I will say right now, that I did not, and the records will not show it.

Mr. CANNON. Did you speak in favor of it?

Mr. EVANS (Weber). I did not, neither did I vote for it.

Mr. CANNON. I wanted to ask if that was true, I had been informed it was.

Mr. EVANS (Weber). There was about thirty thousand dollars which had been appropriated by

the Legislature of 1890, and I think some nineteen thousand dollars of that amount of money had been actually paid to the sugar factory by way of bounties. There was yet about ten thousand dollars_I maybe wrong about the figures, but these are substantially the facts. There was yet about ten thousand dollars remaining. The law would expire in 1893. I voted to divide the remaining amount of money which a previous Legislature had appropriated, between the years 1893 and 1894, or else it was 1892 and 1893. I think that was it. I did not advocate the bounty at that time. I was then opposed to it as much as I am now. But this, gentlemen, is not a question of bounties at all. Suppose some railroad corporation should organize in this Territory with the ostensible purpose of benefitting the people here by bringing in capital and furnishing better and more easy transportation, and suppose it should be organized by some individuals who were influential in the community and who would say, “We cannot carry on this enterprise with our individual credit. We apply to the Legislature of the State for the purpose of securing the aid of the State to guarantee our bonds.” And suppose the Legislature would guarantee bonds of a million or a million and a half or two millions of dollars and suppose the enterprise should prove a failure, should the poor taxpayers who toil and labor day after day be required by means of enforced taxation to contribute to the failure of such a corporation? I put that question to you, gentlemen, and it is not an improper thing that such a thing will occur. Why is it that the great state of New York and other great states in this Union have made similar provisions to this mentioned in the substitutes? A constitutional convention of 1894, which was republican_a majority at least of the members were republican, passed a provision similar to this proposed, “Neither the state nor money of the state shall be given or loaned to or in aid of any association, corporation, or private undertaking,” making some minor exceptions. I only cite this_and, gentlemen, you can cite republican constitution after constitution, along down the list, and you will find that it is the modern trend of constitution making. Why are these provisions inserted in these constitutions in republican states? Because they have felt the evil hand of legislation which has permitted the state to loan its credit to such institutions. Gentlemen of the majority, I predict to you here and now, and I do not expect that it will cause any fear to generate in the minds of you upon the majority_but I predict that if you leave this Constitution so open that such methods as have been practiced in the United States may be practiced here, that the people who elevated you here in power will hurl you back again to the rank of the people.

Mr. EICHNOR, That is where we are going to get anyhow.

Mr. EVANS (Weber). That is where you ought to go and where you will go if you place no restrictions in this Constitution.

Mr. HALLIDAY. And stay there.

Mr. EVANS (Weber). Go before the people of this Territory if you please, and tell them that you have formed a {955} Constitution in which the State will loan its credit to any private individual or corporation, to aid its enterprises, and let the people once understand that you have done it, and I say again that the party now who is in the majority in Utah will not retain that power but a very brief space of time. It was not in your platform of principles. You made no issue upon this at all. Why now do you desire to leave it so that such a thing could be made possible? I will venture to say, instead of bringing capital into this Territory as some people think it will, that capital and

money will shun the Territory. Who would want to invest money in a new State where the business sagacity of men would know that the State was loaning its credit to individual enterprises? The tendency would be to retard capital rather than to invite it, and the tendency would also be to make a paternal government_the very thing which ought not to exist. Look at the case of the Congress of the United States, under the powers which it could exercise under the provisions of the Constitution, loaning its credit and advancing large sums of money for the building of railroads across the continent. To-day we find that those individuals are unable to meet the obligation. To-day we find that there are rumors upon all hands that the first mortgages upon the Pacific railroads are about to be foreclosed. The government has advanced its money, loaned its credit, guaranteed the payment of a certain number of bonds amounting to something over fifty million. Is there any possibility under the circumstances for the government to secure the money it has advanced? I do not believe that any person who has fairly investigated that question will say there is. The first mortgage bonds alone when foreclosed will probably leave the government without any recourse whatever. Even if it does not, look at the trouble which it has already precipitated. You will find too, gentlemen, that if this principle prevails, these very corporations who receive the aid of the State in this manner will in the future be the oppressors of the people. If they do not fail and get the benefit of the money of the State they will grow strong bodies and will exist in the community in defiance of the rights of the people. Every time a government undertakes to give state aid, the people to whom it is given begin to labor under the impression that they have a contract with the State which is irrevocable, a contract which can be enforced in the courts of law, just as it is in the case of the sugar trust and sugar manufacturers, believing that the McKinley bill granted bounties for a certain length of time.

After the law had been repealed by an act of Congress, they fly into the courts and say, “We demand, notwithstanding the repeal of the law, that certain moneys be given to us for these enterprises which we have established.” There is no safe rule by which any government can carry on its business, except to make laws which will redound to the benefit of the people, and to make constitutions and laws for the public good, not to enact them for private individual gain or benefit. There should be an entire and complete separation between individual business and the affairs of the government of the people. Can you say, gentlemen, that it is safe in any sense of the word for the government to join hands with the individual in the private business of the individual? That is exactly what you are leaving open here, so that the Legislature of the future State can do it. It is the very thing which we here desire to prevent, and I thank God that one republican here stands up in his place and introduces a substitute which reaches partially the evil which would be inflicted upon this people were it not to be incorporated in the Constitution.
Mr. VARIAN. May I ask the gentleman {956} a question? Was the gentleman referring to me?

Mr. EVANS (Weber). I was, Mr. Varian.

Mr. VARIAN. Well, I want to disclaim any connection with the substitute.

Mr. EVANS (Weber). You have offered one.

Mr. VARIAN. It has no connection with the matter of that substitute. Mine is an original section, and does not refer to this question that was discussed yesterday at all.

Mr. VARIAN. Mr. President, I very seldom make a motion similar to the one I am going to make now, but I do it because I believe it is in accord with the desire of the house. I move the previous question upon the substitute and the amendment_not the article.

The question being taken on the motion for the previous question, the Convention divided, and by a vote of 56 ayes to 24 noes, the previous question was ordered.

The roll being called on the substitute offered by Mr. Richards, the result was as follows:

AYES_41    
Barnes
Boyer
Buys
Call
Corfman
Creer
Cunningham
Evans, Weber
Evans, Utah
Francis
Hammond
Hart
Halliday
Howard
Hughes
Ivins
Johnson
Kimball, Salt Lake
Lemmon
Lewis
Lowe, Wm.
Low, Cache             
Maeser
Mackintosh
Maloney
Murdock, Wasatch
Nebeker

NOES_47.
Adams
Allen
Anderson
Bowdle
Brandley
Button
Cannon
Chidester
Christiansen
Clark
Coray
Cushing
Eichnor
Eldredge
Emery
Gibbs
Goodwin
Hyde
James                    
Jolley
Keith
Kearns
Kimball, Weber
Lambert
Larsen, L.
Larsen, C. P.
Lowe, Peter
Lund
McFarland

ABSENT_15.
Crane    
Driver    
Miller
Engberg    
Green    
Haynes    
Heybourne    
Hill    
Kiesel
Maughan
Preston            
Ricks
Robinson, Kane
Thatcher
Thorne.

EXCUSED_1.
Farr

PAIRED_2.
Kerr    
Pierce
{957}
The substitute was declared rejected.

AYES_46.
Adams
Barnes
Boyer
Buys
Call
Coray
Corfman
Creer
Cunningham
Evans, Weber
Evans, Utah
Farr
Francis
Hammond
Hart
Halliday
Howard
Hughes
Ivins
Johnson
Kimball, Salt Lake
Lemmon
Lewis            
Lowe, Wm.
Low, Cache
Maeser
Mackintosh
Maloney
Murdock, Wasatch
Nebeker
Partridge
Peters
Raleigh
Richards
Roberts
Robertson
Robison, Wayne
Ryan
Sharp
Snow
Spencer

NOES_44.
Allen
Anderson
Bowdle
Brandley
Button
Cannon
Chidester
Christiansen
Clark
Cushing
Eichnor
Eldredge
Emery
Gibbs
Goodwin
Hyde
James
Jolley
Keith
Kearns
Kimball, Weber
Lambert
Larsen, L.
Larsen, C. P.
Lowe, Peter
Lund
McFarland
Morris
Moritz
Murdock, Beaver
Murdock, Summit
Page
Peterson, Grand
Peterson, Sanpete
Pierce        
Shurtliff
Squires

ABSENT_16.
Crane    
Driver    
Engberg    
Green    
Haynes    
Heybourne    
Hill    
Kiesel    
Kerr
Maughan
Miller
Preston
Ricks
Robinson, Kane
Thatcher
Thorne.

The PRESIDENT. The section adopted.

Mr. ELDREDGE. Mr. President, I ask for the roll call to be repeated. It don't agree with my count.

Mr. VARIAN. I arise to a point of order.

Mr. PIERCE. I arise to a point of order.

Mr. CANNON. I arise to a point of order.

The PRESIDENT. Mr. Varian has the floor on the point of order, what is it?

Mr. VARIAN. The roll call has been announced by the secretary and accepted by the chair and declared official and we cannot have another roll call under those circumstances. The time for challenging the announcement of the vote is after the secretary declares his result to the chair and before the chair announces it.

Mr. EICHNOR. We did not hear it.

Mr. PIERCE. Mr. President, my point of order is that it requires a majority of the delegates elected to pass anything of this kind. It requires fifty-four votes. My point of order is that the motion is lost under the rule.

Mr. VARIAN. Mr. President, I raised the first point of order. I suggest that the rule refers to the article as a whole.

Mr. EICHNOR. Mr. President, I challenge the vote as announced.
{958}
Mr. VARIAN. Somebody else has done that before you.

Mr. IVINS. Mr. President, I move a writ of prohibition to prevent another count.

Mr. VAN HORNE. Mr. President, I call attention to rule 23 which provides that the final vote agreeing to each proposition shall be taken by the yeas and nays and no such proposition shall be considered as agreed to nor the instrument as a whole, except a majority of the delegates elected vote therefor.

The PRESIDENT. I think the point of order is well taken.

Mr. VARIAN. I take an appeal from the decision of the chair. If we are to have any such absurd proposition as that, let us debate it all the afternoon.

Mr. EVANS (Weber). I do not think the president understands it. That is, respecting the article as a whole, or the Constitution as a whole.

The PRESIDENT. This is not a vote on the adoption of the article, as a whole, because there is a section yet untouched. This is simply upon the question of the adoption of this section.

Mr. VARIAN. That would apply to the inserting of a word or striking out of a letter.

Mr. KIMBALL ( Weber). I would like to ask for a construction of that rule.

The PRESIDENT. I think it means the article itself.

Mr. KIMBALL (Weber). It cannot mean that, because that language immediately follows.

Mr. RICHARDS. If you will permit me if you will observe the language, it is not the article as a whole, but to the instrument as a whole.

Mr. KIMBALL (Weber). I understand “article” and “instrument” are the same thing in this connection.

Mr. KIMBALL (Weber). This is not an article offered by Mr. Varian. It is a proposition to go into the Constitution. There the double language isused and I am asking the President for a construction of that rule.

Mr. HART. I call the chair's attention to the fact that this has been ruled upon several times before and it is against the position of the gentleman from Weber. In fact he is the very man, if I remember correctly, that insisted upon the rule that we are now contending for.

Mr. EVANS (Weber). I arise to a point of order. I understood the chair to announce that this rule did not apply to this question. If the gentlemen desire to discuss it, they ought to appeal from the decision of the chair.

Mr. BUTTON. I arise to a point of order_

Mr. CHIDESTER. I arise to a point of order. I understood that on this section as amended the chair rules that it took a majority of the delegates elected to carry it.

The PRESIDENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. CHIDESTER. And I maintain that that is the decision.

Mr. BUTTON. I arise to a point of order. My point of order is that the president passed upon this and that an appeal from the chair had been taken.

Mr. EVANS ( Weber). The chair reversed its ruling.

The PRESIDENT. Don't get excited now, gentlemen.

Mr. EVANS (Weber). I understood the president withdrew the decision, which he at first announced.

The PRESIDENT. The decision of the chair is this, that under this rule a majority of this Convention has to pass upon those matters.

Mr. VARIAN. A majority of the Convention elected?

The PRESIDENT. A majority of the members elected.

Mr. VARIAN. On every proposition to go into the article?

The PRESIDENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. VARIAN. I take an appeal from the decision of the chair.

The PRESIDENT. The chair made that announcement, but the members declared that they had not heard what the statement was as read by the secretary, and on the springing of this question of order upon this rule, the chair determines that a vote of a majority of the members elected was necessary to determine one of these propositions.

Mr. RICHARDS. Does the chair now hold that the motion was lost to insert this article?

The PRESIDENT. No, sir; not in that sense_but that the matter can be reconsidered.

Mr. RICHARDS. I desire to know, Mr. President, what we are voting upon and what the appeal is from?

The PRESIDENT. The appeal is from the decision of the chair as to requiring a majority of the members elected to pass one of these propositions.

Mr. RICHARDS. To pass this section that we voted upon?

The PRESIDENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. VARIAN. Then, I understand it, the motion was lost.

Mr. SQUIRES. The count was challenged. What are you going to do with the challenge?

Mr. RICHARDS. That is what I am trying to find out.

The PRESIDENT. 54 is a majority and but 46 voted for it.

Mr. VARIAN. Now, I understand the motion was lost. Now we appeal from that decision and want to discuss it. Now, gentlemen of the Convention, I trust this matter can be determined without relation to what your desires may be, as to the subject matter behind it. The single question before this Convention for its determination is this, whether the standing rule of the Convention requires that every proposition or amendment whether it be one word or a section to be added to an article upon its third reading, requires a majority vote of the delegates elected to this Convention. If it be so, of necessity, it must apply to every motion that is made upon the third reading of the proposition. It must affect the striking out of a numeral or a letter or a word, as well as the inserting of a section. It certainly has not been the practice in this Convention. No president or chairman has ever ruled it before, and I assume that whether the point was made or not, it would be the duty of any gentleman in the chair to enforce the standing rules and make the point himself, if it be a standing rule of the Convention, just as much as it would be his business to declare that a proposition on its third reading was lost if it only received 52 or 53 votes

without anybody challenging it. Now, let us see how this rule reads. ( Reads rule 23.) It is a tortured and forced construction by you, gentlemen, to interpolate into this rule that “proposition” there means an amendment of any kind presented for the consideration of the Convention, while the whole article is under consideration.

By reference to other rules you will find that this word proposition has a settled meaning, in relation to the context of these rules. It means a complete article upon a particular subject. “A proposition for insertion in the Constitution,” is the language of another rule in relation to the method and procedure which shall govern the introduction and management of propositions introduced for that purpose. For instance, we have a rule providing for a first and second and third reading of a proposition, and a reference to a standing committee. That means the entire proposition governing that subject matter. Now, this rule cannot be interpreted as the gentlemen interpret it, {960} that the final vote agreeing to the first proposition and upon agreeing to the instument as a whole, means the agreeing to every proposition that may be offered by way of amendment. It means the vote agreeing to the proposition when you shall come to take the vote finally upon the entire proposition, just as it does in the case of a legislative bill. Whoever heard of such a proposition being enunciated in a parliamentary body before? Whoever heard of such a proposition being passed upon in that way? It is common parliamentary knowledge that until the final vote is taken upon a third reading of a bill amendments are carried by a majority vote of those present-by a majority of the quorum, if there is only a quorum present, and everybody knows it. Now, can you afford to torture this, to disturb and overturn a plain rule like this, simply because you are disappointed_that is what it means_disappointed in the result of this vote? Let me say to my party associates on this floor, if you are disturbed in your minds and therefore unable to act fairly and properly in the disposition of this appeal because of the thought that may be pressing you that there is something affecting bounties in this proposition, that I disclaim it. There is nothing there. The bounties are still as sacred to you as they were before and they are just as well preserved. It simply refers to the loaning of credit, to the subscribing of stock and bonds in aid of railroads and other similar enterprises, and I ask you
to lay aside all prejudice in this matter and determine this appeal upon its merits.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ought to be exceedingly happy on this occasion, and I am. I hold with the gentleman who has just taken his seat, on this proposition. It is as clear as daylight that he is right upon it, and if this house shall vote against that view of the case, I feel satisfied that it will be because of their prejudice in the subject matter that is behind it, and is affected by this ruling. (Reads rule 23.) I believe, Mr. President and gentlemen of this Convention, that this has reference to the entire article as a proposition, and to the entire Constitution as a whole, and not for the separate motions in any article. Now, if you shall give the interpretation to this rule that
the ruling of the president ascribes to it, then I want to tell you that your motion to put woman's suffrage in the Constitution fails, because the vote to put it in the Constitution was but 52 as against 42, and there was not a majority of members elected that voted to put it in the Constitution, and that is true as to many others of the propositions, and perhaps nearly every question that has been debated upon this floor, and it means unsettling all the work that this Convention has done. Now, if I was as much wedded to this question of suffrage as a good many people think I am, I have good reasons for supporting the chair in this matter, but gentlemen, the proposition involved in this question, as to whether the credit of this State shall be loaned to

corporations, to build up private fortunes and to establish industries for private gain, overshadows all things else, and I gladly give away the advantage that would come to me, however, upon the suffrage question, in order to secure this State against the inroads that will be made upon it if you do not prohibit companies from coming here and begging for the credit of this State to aid them in launching their enterprises. I pray you to divorce yourselves from your prejudices and consider this proposition upon its merits as a parliamentary question alone. That is the way I shall consider it.

Mr. IVINS. Mr. President, it seems to me that the whole question hinges upon a proper interpretation of this word “proposition” as it appears in rule 23. Now, let me call your attention {961} to subdivision 4 of article 3, to begin with, “introduction of ordinances and propositions for insertion in the Constitution.” Now, rule 22, “so soon as any entire proposition for incorporation in the Constitution shall have been disposed of, etc.” Again, in rule 23, “the final vote agreeing to each proposition;” I submit, gentlemen, that “proposition” in every case in which I have referred to it refers to the separate article that is to be incorporated into the Constitution and it has no reference at all to any amendment that may be offered to any section or subdivision there. It can be interpreted in no other way. It seems plain to me that when all of these rules are taken together and properly considered that no one with any desire to be just and fair could set up the claim that this simple amendment that has been offered here is a proposition and must necessarily receive a vote of all the members elected. It is very true that at one time the vote upon the question of woman's suffrage was not made by a majority of the members elected. It is also true that when this article was passed as a whole, it did receive a great many more than a majority of all the members elected, and consequently stands there firm and solid, just as it should, and so this proposition, when it is perfected and completed must receive a majority of all the votes of the members elected before it can be sent to the committee on compilation. I claim, gentlemen, that the decision of the chair is wrong, that it ought to be reversed and I shall vote in favor of the appeal.

Mr. KIMBALL ( Weber). Mr. President, the gentlemen are entirely mistaken when they think our side of this question is so prejudiced that we will vote to change any rule of this Convention. The only matter that I objected to was the ruling of the chair immediately upon the statement of the secretary of what the vote was, and then refusing to entertain a challenge. It gave no opportunity. Now, sir, my objection to that was that it took so long to figure up that ballot that I was convinced from the tally kept here by ourselves that the vote was wrong, and that it was announced wrong by the secretary_not intentionally, but by mistake, in figuring it up, and that we had a right to have a recall of that roll. I agree with the gentlemen as to the construction of that rule_and shall vote, so far as this question is concerned, against the decision of the chair, that it requires a majority to pass any amendment. And so far as Mr. Roberts hugging the sweet delusion to his soul that the woman's suffrage vote did not carry under the ruling that the chair has now made, the amendment failed there because it did not have a majority of all elected, but when section 1 was put before the house for adoption, it had 75 to 16, so there was a majority and it is in the Constitution, much to my regret.

Mr. EVANS (Weber). You voted for it.

If this is not a proposition, for God's {962} sake, is not it other matter?

Mr. IVINS. Are we voting now to insert this in the Constitution?

Mr. VAN HORNE. I think so.

Mr. IVINS. No, we are not. We vote to put it in the Constitution when we vote on the article as a whole. We are not voting to put it in the Constitution.

Mr. JAMES. May I ask Mr. Ivins a question?

Mr. IVINS. Yes, sir.

Mr. JAMES. Could we reject this in the article and vote the balance through_would not we have to reject the whole or no part of it?

Mr. IVINS. Why, of course we would. If this goes into it_    

Mr. JAMES. Is not this the last vote upon this as a separate article? Can there be any other vote upon this as a separate article?

Mr. VARIAN. You can amend it.

Mr. VAN HORNE. I thought I had the floor. I was saying, as I view this thing under our rules, this is the last chance this Convention has to consider a proposition and determine what the sections of that proposition shall be until it is reported from the committee on arrangement, and then only phraseology. I maintain that it would be an unheard of thing, if, after the adoption by unanimous vote, practically speaking, of the main part of an article or proposition, a bare majority of the Convention which is by no means fully represented, could force into that article things that are repugnant, as many of us think, to the rest of the article, and to the balance of it, and force men to the proposition that they must vote against the whole article or vote in favor of something that they do not believe in. I think that the reason of the proposition being considered as a whole_an article being considered as a whole, is that after it is passed it shall require a majority vote of all the members elected to add it to the article, because that majority vote being

to add it to the article, will in no wise interfere with the passage of the article as a whole. Suppose a case, that the vote would stand with this amendment added, just as it has done on the question of the proposition of adding the amendment. All that we have done without any question in the past would be done away with by the act of men who voted then as they vote now. The work that we have gone through with and all agreed upon would be done away with, by the vote standing upon the article as a whole, just as it stood upon this question. And gentlemen maintain that it was the intention of these rules to trap the Convention into doing work for days and days and then allow, upon a sprung question with a representation of the Convention not fully here, an amendment to be put in that will force the question of doing away with all the work of the preceding days, in order to avoid having to take that amendment. If the Convention was all represented here there could be no harm in that perhaps because then there would be a majority vote, and a majority vote would carry it when it came to the submission of the whole article or the whole Constitution, but I think, taking those two rules together_the first rule that the final vote agreeing to each proposition must be a majority vote, and then that no proposition or other matter shall be inserted in the Constitution unless by the assent of the majority of the members elected to the Convention, it means that we are to proceed in each case by a majority when an article has been adopted, that an addition to it must be passed by a majority of this Convention.

Mr. CREER. Would it not take this proposition of Varian's as being in the nature of an amendment to the article?

Mr. VAN HORNE. I take it as being in the nature of an addition to the article and being a separate matter to be inserted in the Constitution.

Mr. CREER. It is an amendment, is it not_still further?
{963}
Mr. VAN HORNE. I think not, sir.

Mr. CREER. Can you find a precedent anywhere, either in a municipal, legislative, or a state legislative body, where it required a majority of those elected to insert an amendment?

Mr. EVANS ( Weber). Nobody can.

Mr. CREER. You cannot find it, sir. Your position is entirely untenable.

Mr. HART. For fear, Mr. President, that there might be some chance for ambiguity in the wording of this proposition or difference of opinion as to its construction, and for the purpose of getting a construction upon it, that we might be guided by it, and know what the rule was upon the subject, I distinctly brought this matter to the attention of the Convention and of the president for the purpose of having a ruling upon it and did that at the first stages of the third reading upon propositions when we were considering the preamble and declaration of rights. The ruling of the chair at that time was that proposition did not mean a single section, but that it meant the whole article, and I was satisfied with the ruling as a general proposition for this reason, that if the ruling of the chair had been otherwise I realized that we would have to bring in an amendment to the rule for the reason that it was simply impracticable. It was a useless waste of time to call the

ayes and noes on every section of this Constitution, and if it had been the ruling of the chair, I would then have favored an amendment to the rules, making it, sir, that the ayes and noes were to be called upon the whole proposition. The ruling of the chair was as before stated that the proposition here meant the whole article. Every one acquiesced in that ruling. I think the matter was passed upon perhaps once afterwards, and now, sir, we have proceeded upon that ruling until this time.

As was suggested by one of the previous speakers, if the ruling now is defeated, that proposition means section_then we shall have to go back and pass upon each one of these propositions over again and these sections, or else we will have to suspend the rules and pass upon the whole together in one lump. I take it that another rule that we have adopted here_a special rule requiring the secretary to enter upon his minutes the ruling of the chair upon every proposition has this end in view, that members may know what the ruling of the chair is and be governed accordingly, and for that reason, I am opposed to the chair reversing his former decision upon this matter and I shall, therefore, vote reversing the chair upon this proposition.

Mr. ELDREDGE. Mr. President, I most certainly take issue with my distinguished friend from Salt Lake and also the gentleman from Davis upon this question upon two grounds. (Reads rule 23.) Now, Mr. President, I hold that this proposition_I cannot call it anything else than a proposition, because it certainly embodies within itself a full and complete proposition looking to a certain and a specific purpose, and if this proposition had received a majority of the votes of this Convention and all the balance of the article had failed receiving a majority of the votes, this proposition would have gone into the Constitution. I hold that under our rule. And if such was not the case, it was simply a waste of time in calling the yeas and nays. It might as well be determined in some other way, and in addition to this it was introduced as a separate proposition. It did not appear in that article from the committee of the whole, but it came here in a separate and distinct form.

Mr. EVANS (Weber). May I ask you a question? Does any amendment which is an addition to any section appear upon the proposition itself?

Mr. EDREDGE [*note*]. If the yeas and nays were called for on any amendment, as it was on this, it would assume exactly {964} the same position that this has assumed. There is no amendment, I hold, that enters into any article that goes to form this Constitution, but what received by assent, if not by a direct vote, a majority of those voting upon it.

Mr. ROBERTS. Will the gentleman permit me a question? Would not this substitute that is here offered form part of the legislative article if adopted and become part of it?

Mr. ELDREDGE. That depends on what becomes of the legislative article.

Mr. ROBERTS. I ask another question and that is, is it not designed by the movers of it to make it a part of the legislative article?

Mr. ELDREDGE. A thing may be designed and yet it may not be perfected.

Mr. ELDREDGE. I hold, sir, that if it had received a majority of the yeas and nays, it would have become a part of the Constitution, if all the balance of this article had failed under our rules, and if not, what is the use, Mr. President, of spending time calling the roll and ascertaining whether or not there are a majority in favor of the proposition?

Mr. EVANS (Weber). For the purpose of putting the delegates on record. That is why the yeas and nays are called_to give the delegates an opportunity to put themselves on record.

Mr. ELDREDGE. Well, I am not so anxious to get upon record as to waste our time in any such form. I do not know what other people may be. (Reads rule 27. )

I hold, when the proposition is made to amend a certain section and when the vote is announced, that if the yeas and nays are not called upon it, they assent to that proposition and by reason of that it becames a portion of the section which it is proposed to amend. Now, I think, if we will go back and find the record that when the yeas and nays were taken upon the first section of the article of elections and rights of suffrage, it was determined as passed, though it may not have received a majority. The question was not raised, and if the other portion of that article had failed getting the proper support that would have passed to the committee on compilation.

Mr. THURMAN. May I ask the gentleman a question? Suppose an amendment was offered to an article and there were 53 votes for it and 25 against it, would you say the amendment prevailed or would the amendment be lost?

Mr. ELDREDGE. Let me ask you how you would propose that the vote should be taken_yeas and nays?

Mr. THURMAN. I do not care how, whether by rising vote, or yeas and nays, or what.

Mr. ELDREDGE. If you took it by the yeas and nays, I would say that it was lost.

Mr. THURMAN. The rule says by the assent, it does not say the yeas and nays.

Mr. ELDREDGE. If the yeas and nays were not called and fifty-three voted for and the balance voted against and the chair announced the result, and the yeas and nays were not called for, I hold, then, that the balance acquiesced in the proposition.

Mr. THURMAN. If that rule is true, can you point to one single proposition that you can call to mind now, where the ayes and noes have been called, that has been passed?

Mr. ELDREDGE. Why, every article that has_

Mr. THURMAN. I am speaking of single propositions.

Mr. THURMAN. There were seventy-five yeas on that.

Mr. ELDREDGE. I am not sure; but when the yeas and nays were called on the balance of the article, it was only called upon that portion which remained. I am not positive on that question.

Mr. EVANS (Utah). I am.

Mr. ELDREDGE. It may have been called on the whole.

Mr. VARIAN. Mr. President, I will ask gentlemen now to ask themselves if they do not really believe in their own minds that this is a little bit of a subterfuge. I know what it is, for the sake of accomplishing some ulterior purpose, to say, fix the lenses of mental vision and adjust them, as it were, so that you are enabled almost to read the proposition in any wise. Let me ask you, gentlemen, this question; when you are sitting in the committee of the whole, you are delegates, are you not, elected to the Constitutional Convention? Do you contend that an amendment there offered to a proposition that has come from one of your standing committees requires of necessity a majority of the delegates elected to the Convention?

Mr. ELDREDGE. It is a different proposition.

Mr. VARIAN. Is it a different proposition, my friend from Summit County?

Mr. ELDREDGE. May I ask the gentleman a question?

Mr. VARIAN. Yes.

Mr. ELDREDGE. Do you call the yeas and nays in the committee of the whole?

Mr. VARIAN. No. The gentleman makes his distinction between the different propositions to depend upon the calling of the yeas and nays. I beg to inform him the calling of the yeas and nays is simply determining with precision and accuracy for the record the actual conclusion of the body. There is nothing in the matter of calling the yeas and nays in the sense that my friend uses it. Why, in Congress hundreds of bills are passed every year_hundreds of them, without anything more than a simple aye and no vote, many of the most important bills. When some member challenges the fact as to the determination of the body, then the yeas and nays are called for. So here. But let us see. Take rule 21. (Reads.) That is after it comes from the standing committee. You will remember that other rule that when a proposition_an article, something referring to a

specific subject, comes from a standing committee, it goes right on to the calendar of the committee of the whole. In the committee of the whole, propositions shall be read by the chairman and considered item by item. What does that mean? (Reads rule.) Now, I ask again of these gentlemen, can they escape the logical result of that argument, if it shall prevail here, that at least fifty-four votes must be cast for every amendment in the committee of the whole, and do you mean that? Do you believe the rule contemplated that?

Mr. ELDREDGE. No

Mr. VARIAN. The gentleman says he does not, but his reason for the distinction is utterly beyond parliamentary comprehension. He gives as a reason, because you have not got your aye and no vote there. You can take the vote of members by division and ascertain it just as accurately and precisely as you can by calling the ayes and noes. Still an amendment goes on. It may be an entire section, it may be a line, it may be a phrase, or a section may be stricken out, and when it comes back, gentlemen, from the committee of the whole, it is a proposition as a whole; it is a bill. It is then upon the calendar for third reading and final passage, and the final passage never comes until the third reading {966} is completed, and the third reading is not completed until the Convention or the legislative body has gotten through with the amending of it, from start to finish, section by section. Time is given for amendment, even after you go through to the last section, you may go back to the first, as was ruled here the other day, because this is the time when the proposition or the bill is to be put into shape, and when you are through with your amendments and your discussion, the question is on the final passage of the proposition, and there is never a roll call in this sense until that time shall arrive. “The final vote,” what does that mean? Gentlemen give no significance or weight to the word “final.” They would read it “every vote,” agreeing to each proposition or to any proposition. (Reads rule 23.) That is in perfect harmony with the general principle governing these questions. That is in general harmony with the constitutional and other laws everywhere on the passage of bills; before they shall become laws, a majority of the members elected must agree thereto upon the final vote, upon the third reading, except that this Convention goes one step further and requires still another final vote, when all the propositions shall have passed-another final vote upon the Constitution as a whole. So that if, after all the propositions have been considered and agreed to, when they are put together and arranged, it shall appear that still a majority of the delegates are not satisfied with it, they can arrest it then. But that is not the question. (Reads rule 22.) Now, this section 36 that was adopted here my amendment, is that to be referred to the committee on compilation and arrangement? Not, so. It still has to pass the challenge of this house. There may be amendments offered to that, perhaps. Men who voted in favor of it may give notice of reconsideration. There may still be another vote upon it. The final vote does not come until the whole article is passed upon, and as I said before, do not deceive yourselves, because you certainly do not deceive me, in the belief that this house, as a house, believes in this evasion of this rule. It has never been considered so here, and every gentleman on this floor knows it. There have been matters hotly contested time and again during the five weeks of the sitting of this Convention and it passes all comprehension that they all should have gone through with a unanimity in cases where there were less than a majority of the delegates elected declaring the majority vote in favor of it without challenge. We do not believe it. We do not believe that it was ever thought of until to-day and that the purpose is because of the failure of the majority' on this

floor to carry through a proposition or to defeat a proposition. However that may be, gentlemen, let me point out a way to you, if you desire to eliminate this section from this article. Do not do it by overturning and overriding all parliamentary rule and your own standing rule. Do it in the ordinary parliamentary, manly, American way_give notice of a reconsideration and get your men in here and if you can bamboozle them into the belief_

Mr. THURMAN. They have not got any men.

Mr. VARIAN. that they have got a bounty in it here, they can set it aside. Do not establish this precedent. It may come back to vex you to-morrow.

Mr. JAMES. Mr. President, I am just as anxious to understand the rules that have been given to us for the government of this house, as anybody possibly can be in it. And I have especially looked over this matter since the gentlemen commenced to argue it, and I have before me rule 23, which each one of you have. Now, I want to know in all reason how any gentleman can take that rule and construe it differently from the way the chair has ruled upon {967} this question? I am not going to argue the merits of this rule. I do not know anything about the merits, and I care less. (Reads rule 23.) Now, in any reason, can a man maintain in this language before this Convention, that that is not the plainest English statement that I ever saw put upon a piece of paper?

Mr. ROBERTS. Would the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. JAMES. Why, certainly.

Mr. ROBERTS. Does not the fact that in line 1, it is said that a final vote agreeing to each proposition, and upon agreeing to the proposition as a whole, shall be taken by yeas and nays, presuppose previous votes being taken on parts of the proposition?

Mr. JAMES. No, sir; I do not think it presupposes anything. It is too plain a proposition. It says the final vote agreeing to each proposition. Now, it may be very funny to some gentlemen in this Convention, that have seen fit to make fun of everything that has been brought before this Convention, from the time it convened up until the present moment, Mr. President, unless it agreed with their view, but I say that I have as much right to my opinion, irrespective of the funny part of the proposition, as any other gentleman upon this floor, and I stand here, thinking I came to a dignified body, where men do not attempt to break down or sneer at men when they get up to make a proposition upon this floor. Now, I will say again, Mr. President, if the gentlemen will make rules they should live by them, they should stand up to them. When you put upon a piece of paper a single proposition, let us admit it. Now, if there has been a wrongdoing up to this time, it does not change the fact. ( Reads rule 23.) Now, Mr. President, these gentlemen would tell you that they have established a rule that will admit into an article a section upon a bare majority of all present, when that section would contain the whole gist of the article, and the article itself cannot be adopted without a majority vote of every delegate elected to this Convention. Now, is that a reasonable proposition?

Mr. EVANS ( Weber), Mr. President, I would not say anything upon this occasion, did I not

think it necessary, because of the courtesies that I have many times received at the hands of the chair, and I would not, if I did not think the question involves a vital parliamentary question, make any remarks that would be derogatory to that decision. But gentleman of this Convention, it has been put to you pretty pointedly by the gentleman from Salt Lake, that if the decision of the chair be sustained in this instance a fundamental, elementary, parliamentary principle will be violated. I do not think it necessary to discuss questions or rules, but only to call your attention to the fact that it is not only the written parliamentary rule, but the unwritten rule that in all parliamentary and legislative bodies, where a proposition is under consideration, amendments might be made to that proposition by a majority of the quorum present. That is so elementary that I am astonished that some men will dispute the proposition. Is a mere amendment, a proposition, which finally to be voted upon? Why, sir, you permit the decision of the chair to stand in this instance, and do you, gentlemen of the majority, think that you can make a Constitution this summer? Suppose the minority here were to undertake to obstruct legislation, obstruct the formation of this Constitution, do you think you have enough republicans to form it? Some of your members are likely to be sick, some of them are likely to be away from home on pressing business occasions, some of them on account of the sickness of their families, and for diverse reasons. I warn you that if you establish this precedent here, such obstructions might {968} be thrown in the way of forming a Constitution that it would be almost impossible for you to effect it.

Mr. ELDREDGE. May I ask you a question?

Mr. EVANS (Weber). Yes, sir.

Mr. ELDREDGE. Is it not more to my interests than to yours_to the republican interests than the democratic interests to have a Constitution?

Mr. EVANS (Weber). Why, not the least in the world, but I will reply to the gentleman from Salt Lake, that he has underlying his position on this floor the fact, the belief, that some republican principle is about to be violated, because of the fact that the majority of the Convention present sought merely to prevent the future State from endorsing and guaranteeing the commercial paper of private corporations. It is not a question of bounties here at all, gentlemen. The instrument is amply left open, so that you can put your hands into the public treasury and take out cash from the people and bestow it upon favored individuals.

Mr. BOWDLE. Mr. President, I call the gentleman to order. He is not speaking to the question. He is arguing the whole question.

Mr. EVANS (Weber). I am speaking of the motives underlying those gentlemen who desire to sustain the decision of the chair here. I say, and I say it without fear of contradiction, that if this were an ordinary question about which there was no politics, the chair himself would not have made the decision, much less the gentlemen_

Mr. BOWDLE. I call the gentleman to order. He has no right to castigate the chair here in that manner.

Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, I arise to a point of order. I insist that the gentleman is doing that which is contrary to parliamentary practice, and he cannot thus criticise the chair and be in order.

Mr. EVANS (Weber). If I may, Mr. President, I will withdraw any remark that I made derogatory to it, because of my friendly relations to the chair. I would not say a word that would reflect upon it.

Mr. PRESIDENT. You need not spare the chair for relations' sake.

Mr. EVANS (Weber). Now, gentlemen, we have been here day after day for thirty-five days or more. If this principle be established, mark what I tell you, that you will have a difficult path to travel. It cannot not be otherwise. It could not be otherwise in any legislative body. It could not be otherwise in Congress_in the Legislature, or in the city council. The final vote upon the whole proposition is the only instance in which a majority of all the members elected are required, in order to pass it. A quorum under all circumstances and upon every occasion, or whether a majority of a quorum is sufficient to insert an amendment in any proposition. As Mr. Hart has stated, the chair has once ruled that this was true, and the gentleman from Cache desired a construction upon that rule and was ruled out of order. Gentlemen, be patriotic, do as your leader has informed you. If you think you have made a mistake and desire to have this matter stricken out, move to reconsider in the orderly manner, but do not, under the guise of desiring to leave the Constitution so open that corporations may receive the credit of the State, violate fundamental principles of parliamentary law.

Mr. SQUIRES. Mr. President, I move the previous question.

The motion for the previous question was rejected,

Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, I would like to ask Mr. Evans a question?

Mr. EVANS (Weber). I am perfectly willing.

Mr. CANNON. I desire to ask Mr. {969} Evans his interpretation of the latter part of rule 27. (Reads.)

Mr. EVANS (Weber.) That is a majority constitutes a quorum for the transaction of business. The proposition referred to in rule 27, as I understand it, is the main proposition, like a bill pending in the Legislature. It does not mean amendments.

Mr. CANNON. The words, “or other matter,” how would you interpret that?

Mr. EVANS (Weber). Well, I do pot know just what that would reach, I am sure; I have not thought about that. It certainly would not reach an amendment. It is something to be inserted in

the Constitution.

Mr. ROBERTS. I would suggest that it would be on the submission of a separate article.

Mr. PARTRIDGE. Mr. President, I have noticed that when anything is under discussion there are a few men who occupy the floor, and a man that is a little backward about it, does not have an opportunity until they all get tired and worn out, and then they want the previous question. Now, with regard to this matter, it seems to me there is one thing that some of these gentlemen overlooked when they hold that this amendment proposed by Mr. Varian is in the nature of a proposition. If I understand the order of business here, when a proposition is presented to this house, it is referred to a committee and they have to act upon it and bring it in here and take its regular order. But this amendment of Mr. Varian's, or this section that is proposed to be added here, is simply in the nature of an amendment to the proposition. This section, it is true, has been discussed. I do not see how anyone can understand that this refers to an amendment to a proposition. The proposition itself, upon final agreement of it, must be by a majority of the members elected, and also the instrument. What does the instrument mean? It does not mean the proposition. It means the Constitution, as I understand it. The final agreement on the instrument, which is the Constitution, that we are making, and I do not see why men should occupy so much time in telling so little.

Mr. GOODWIN. Mr. President, I am sorry that we have not had a photographer here as well as a stenographer this last hour. It would have been something to keep in the future, because we have had some displays. What I want to say is more in explanation of how I feel, perhaps, than to be entirely strictly applying to the subject. The gentleman from Weber, Mr. Evans, said that beside our rules, there was an unwritten law here. I am going behind that. I am going back to the original law of nature, which gives every man and everybody the right to self preservation.

We have been told something about being engaged in what in chaste language would be called a trick. I want to say that the reason we are in this position is because of a trick. The secretary made an error in his count, or two gentlemen beside me made errors. We had the majority, but in the hasty work, the secretary made an error. It was reported to the president, and he ruled before anyone in the world could interpose any objection or make any motion. Taking advantage of that, knowing that the ruling was the other way perhaps, and perhaps not, I won't say_the parliamentary law was sprung that the question had been determined by the president. That was perfectly legitimate, but the thing now to do is to correct that error, if we can, and rather than to vote this whole measure down_this whole article, if we can get it back on the floor, it will save a great deal of trouble. Further than that, if we cannot, it will be necessary to vote down the whole measure, because, I know that the sentiment of my constituents, and all of this city, which contains at least a quarter of the voters of this Territory, is that they do not {970} want anything like that in the Constitution. It is simply some of the hair of the same dog that we thought we had killed yesterday. To come down to the point, it is simply forcing into the Constitution something which will prevent the people of this city or any other city doing what they want to do with their means.

Mr. CREER. May I ask the gentleman a question? Is not the gentleman who introduced this

substitute a delegate from this city?

Mr. GOODWIN. He seemed to be a delegate at large.

Mr. CREER. Then, how can you challenge the sentiment of the city?

Mr. GOODWIN. I do not believe that is pertinent. I am simply giving my belief. It is simply a continuation of what we thought we had squelched yesterday, and it is easy enough to see where it comes from. The first real hearty cheer we had this week came from democratic headquarters, when it was announced that that vote had been carried. I deny that it ever was carried. There are just as good mathematicians here_I was not engaged in it myself, I take no credit, but a gentleman on either side of me took that count and it gave us two majority. So a vote to sustain the chair is a matter of self-preservation.

Mr. EVANS (Weber). What was your count?

Mr. GOODWIN. Forty-four and forty-five his was.

Mr. EVANS (Weber). There were 45 yeas were there not, according to your count?

Mr. GOOD WIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. EVANS (Weber). That would not change the result. A count was made here by disinterested parties that agreed exactly with the secretary, and even your count does not seem to change the result.

Mr. GOODWIN. There is a majority of one on the one hand and a majority of two on the other. I merely wish to explain that I am going to vote to sustain the chair and I am doing it for the purpose of getting this back, if possible, on the floor because it seems to me that this comes now to be submitted with the rest of the article. We are apt to squelch it all and have to do it over again.

Mr. WELLS. Cannot you subserve the same purpose by reconsideration?

Mr. GOODWIN. If some gentleman who voted in the affirmative will make the motion, yes.

Mr. WELLS. I am prepared to state that there is a gentleman who voted in the affirmative who will move to reconsider it.

Mr. GOODWIN. I hail that as a good omen. I am glad to see men reform even in their old age.

Mr. IVINS. Does the gentleman still wish to sustain the chair after this statement that has been made?

Mr. GOODWIN. Miners always keep on the ore. I will sustain the chair until we get beaten.

Mr. EVANS (Utah). Mr. President, I take it for granted that this committee desires to hear some more on this question, for the reason that they have just defeated the previous question. It appears very strange that we should disagree so materially upon a section of the rule. Section 23 provides distinctively for two things that are to be done that require a majority of all the members elected to this Convention. I submit to you, sir, that if we shall proceed upon the line that has been sought to be followed out by gentlemen that have spoken upon this floor, that of necessity it must constitute three distinct propositions upon which it must require a majority of all the votes elected to this Convention. If you will notice in rule 22, it provides. (Reads.) That is, taking the various propositions, when they are finally arranged and compiled. They have a right to arrange them and make them harmonize with themselves, so far as they do not interfere with the subject matter. Now, Mr. President, I take it that one of the conditions and one of the requirements is that it is ecessary after that labor has been done that the majority of all the members elected to this Convention_

Mr. MILLER. Doesn't this require the committee on compilation and arrangement.

Mr. EVANS (Utah). Yes, sir.

Mr. MILLER. Rule 22 goes under the general rules, does it not?

Mr. EVANS (Utah). I will come to that directly. After the committee on engrossment and enrollment have returned it back here for its final passage, as a whole, when it is acted upon, if it shall receive the majority of all the members elected to this Convention, it will be the Constitution. That is what is referred to as one of the things that requires a majority vote of all the members in rule 23. The instrument that has been returned back by the committee on compilation and arrangement, is the instrument as a whole. Now, sir, I submit to you, that the final vote agreeing to each proposition means and can mean nothing else than that it shall be the proposition after it has been amended by the committee or by the Convention, and has finally come to the position when it shall be passed upon to make a part of that Constitution that shall be turned over to the committee of the whole. And I ask the gentlemen upon this floor to point out to me another provision that will bear out their theory-making the third that requires the

Convention to pass upon by a majority of the whole members elected. Now, sir, let us turn to rule 27, and analyze that for a moment. (Reads.) Now, what does that mean? Why, it means that they may do all ordinary business, that whatever comes up before this Convention, if there shall be a majority of the members elected here, that whatever the majority of that number shall do, except as to passing of those final articles, after amended, for the purpose of placing them in the Constitution, and for the purpose of passing the Constitution itself, shall be binding upon the members that are absent. I want to ask you, if they haven't got the right to do the business of the Convention, with the exception of the propositions to which I have referred, how are they to enforce the rules and bring in those absentees? Now, the object of bringing in those absentees, as I come to the last and final proposition. (Reads rule.)

Mr. President, I submit to you, that that is a modification, showing that the majority of the members elected here are a quorum to do business for this Convention, except as to those two things. The gentleman from Salt Lake asked what these other matters were. {972} I submit to you, sir, that it may be one of two things, or perhaps more, but one of those things might be this: there may be a matter that will be necessary to submit to the vote of the people separately, as it has been sought to do in this Convention already. That would be one of the things not to be inserted in the Constitution and it requires that the same effect shall operate, in order to carry that measure into effect, as for the passage of the Constitution itself. I submit to you, sir, that it might be necessary, after we shall have completed our labors and passed an article and have inserted it into the Constitution and have completed our work upon that question_we may find some important question that we have passed by. I submit to you, sir, that “other matters” means that that might be taken by this Convention and under its final rule of the majority of all the members elected to this Convention, they could place that in also.

Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, at the time this matter first came up, the desire was to find exactly how the vote stood. The vote was called for and an appeal was taken, but the point was raised that we did not call for it at that time. I submit that all of this time that has been wasted, or has been used in talking upon this subject, will not change the matter and I believe that the end will be the same in either way, either by sustaining the decision of the chair, or by a reconsideration, as some gentleman signified his willingness to move a reconsideration. For this reason and because I believe it to be in the interest of saving time, I now move the previous question.

The previous question was ordered.

The roll being called on the appeal from the decision of the chair, the vote was as follows:

AYES_21.
Allen        
Brandley    
Cannon    
Chidester
Crane
Eldredge
Emery

NOES_67.
Adams
Anderson
Barnes
Boyer
Button
Buys
Call
Clark
Coray
Corfman
Creer
Cunningham
Eichnor
Evans, Weber
Evans, Utah
Francis
Hammond
Hart
Halliday
Howard
Hughes
Hyde
Ivins
Johnson
Keith
Kearns
Kimball, Salt Lake
Kimball, Weber
Larsen, C. P.

ABSENT_16.
Christiansen
Cushing
Driver
Engberg
Green

PAIRED_2.
Bowdle    
Lewis.

The decision of the chair was not sustained.

Mr. VARIAN. Mr. President, of course it will not do to have any proposition carried into this article under any circumstances of doubt or distrust. It ought only to be incorporated there after fair and full consideration and upon a vote as to which there is and can be no question in the minds of the opponents of the measure. I therefore ask this house on my motion to reconsider this vote by which this amendment of mine has been carried, which, if it shall be done, I will ask to have it continued over until to-morrow and proceed to other matters connected with this article. I move a reconsideration.

Mr. THURMAN, Mr. President, it may be that I misunderstood the motion, or the notice the gentleman gave. I understood his motion is that we reconsider the vote. I would like to move that this question be made the special order for to-morrow.

Mr. VARIAN. I accept that.

Mr. THURMAN. With that understanding, I have nothing further to say at the present time.

Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, I arise to a point of order, that we could not reconsider it at all to- morrow. It must be reconsidered the day it is passed. I do not know what the gentleman's motive is for making it.

Mr. CHIDESTER. Mr. President, I understand that in this case the rules are suspended if that is made a special order. That it could be reconsidered tomorrow. Is that the understanding?

Mr. THURMAN. I do not think there is any question about that.

Mr. VARIAN. Mr. President, it is not to violate any rule, but simply do as we did in the suffrage

question.

The motion was agreed to.

The PRESIDENT. Section 31 is now under consideration.

Section 31 was read.

Mr. VARIAN. Mr. President, I now call attention to paragraph 9. It was in committee of the whole. The words “irrevocable, special, or exclusive,” I move to strike out those four words in line 21. Of course, you must bear in mind that this is under the first clause of the section, prohibiting the Legislature from enacting private or special laws granting any privileges, immunity or franchise, whatever. In section 24 of the bill of rights the general prohibition against irrevocable franchises and privileges is found, and if this is not taken out here, there might be an implication that by special law the Legislature could grant a special privilege or immunity that was not irrevocable. Now, that is not the intention of the Convention, I am certain. Their intention is first to prohibit the Legislature generally from granting any privilege or franchise which shall be irrevocable in its nature. Second, the intention is to prohibit granting by special law any privilege, immunity, or franchise, whether it is irrevocable or not, so you have the two counts. One is the bill of rights, which is general, as to the irrevocability of the privilege, and one in this article, which is as to special legislation.

The motion to strike out was agreed to.

Mr. VARIAN. Mr. President, I now move to add the amendment which has been printed to section 31, at the end of the section.

Insert after line 32, the following:

But nothing in this section shall be construed to deny or restrict the power of the Legislature to establish and regulate the compensation and fees of county and township officers; to establish and regulate the rates of freight, passage, toll and charges of railroads, toll roads, ditch, flume, and tunnel companies, incorporated under the laws of this State or doing business therein.

Mr. VARIAN. Well, I do not know. I will say frankly, Mr. President, I am not prepared to say. That is a question of constitutional law and construction, that I would not like to answer just now. I find that this provision has been adopted so often that it occurred to me without further investigation that it would be just as well to put it in the Constitution.

Mr. JAMES. I want to suggest to Mr. Varian that this matter has been provided for in the article on incorporations.

Mr. VARIAN. Well, I don't desire to encumber it. I will ask the gentleman, is this principle

provided for in the article to be reported? I do not understand that the article on incorporations has been reported.

Mr. JAMES. No, but it has been agreed upon by the sub-committee and will be submitted to the full committee just as soon as I can get them together.

Mr. VAN HORNE. Mr. President, it seems to me that it is unnecessary here. There is nothing in this article that deals with the subject of regulating that at all. I do not believe that there is any question about the fact that the Legislature has the power to control those things anyhow. If we had provided for rates of fare in the article, it might have been proper to have put this section in. This section does not confer upon the Legislature a right to do that, but this section says nothing shall prohibit them from restricting that right, and for that reason it seems to me a superfluous amendment.

Mr. EICHNOR. I would like to ask Mr. Varian another question. If this amendment is added to line 32, would the Legislature have power to make special regulations as to the rates of freight on a certain line?

Mr. VARIAN. I think not.

The question being taken on the adoption of the amendment, the Convention divided and by a vote of 41 ayes to 29 noes, the amendment was agreed to.

Mr. VARIAN. Mr. President, I offer for the consideration of the Convention one more amendment to this section, after line 3:

First.    Regulating the jurisdiction and duties of justices of the peace;

Second. For the punishment of crimes and misdemeanors;

Third. Regulating the practice of courts of justice;

Fourth. Providing for a change of venue in civil or criminal actions;

Fifth. For the assessment and collection of taxes;

Sixth. Regulating the interest on money;

Seventh. Changing the law of descent or succession.

Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, I notice some of those matters are covered by other committees. I do not know what the object is of putting them in here. I do not know as it is necessary. It seems to me to be providing twice for the same point. For instance, the item on taxes, the revenue and taxation report that is before the Convention provides that that shall always be uniform, and that

there shall not be special taxes, and why insert it here? I ask for information.

Mr. VARIAN. Mr. President, I do not know anything about the provision in the article on revenue. It has not been passed, and I find these provisions are usual and are affirmed in every case where the Constitution is made. I did not know, I will say to you, gentlemen, what this article on revenue and taxation provides. It simply provides against special legislation.

Mr. BUYS. I would like to ask Mr. Varian if it would not be well to put police magistrates in with justices of the peace_whether you would have any objection to that?

Mr. VARIAN. Not at all. I have no {975 - PETITIONS AND MEMORIALS} objection to it. If the gentleman makes the suggestion, I will accept it.

Mr. BUYS. Regulating the duties and jurisdiction of justices of the peace and police magistrates.

Mr. EICHNOR. Is there any such an office as police magistrate in this Territory?

Mr. BUYS. I do not know, but there can be and will be probably under our State law.

The amendment offered by Mr. Buys was rejected.

The amendment offered by Mr. Varian was agreed to.

Mr. BUYS. Mr. President, in subdivision five of this article, I think the word “town” should be in the plural, on the first line of the page, and the ninth line of this section. And there is no provision for highways in here, which I think should be, and I would move that the word highways be inserted after the words “town plats.”

The amendments were agreed to.

Mr. L. LARSON. Mr. President, I wish to call your attention to section 6. I make a motion that the word “twenty-five” be stricken out, in line 3, and the word “thirty” be inserted instead thereof.

Mr. BARNES. We voted that down yesterday.

Mr. L. LARSON. I understand that. I wish to explain why I make this motion. I desire to be reported correctly on this question. When I made the motion, it has been reported in the papers that it was thirty-five years that I wanted a senator to be before he could be a senator. It was thirty. I do not want this to go home to my constituents, who are young people of this Territory, that I want them to be thirty-five years, and hence I take this method to be correctly reported.

Mr. THURMAN. I move a vote of censure on the newspapers.

The amendment was rejected.

Mr. HOWARD. Mr. President, I wish to offer an amendment to section 6. I move that the words “or representative,” be inserted after the word “senator,” on line 2 of section 6, and that section 7 be stricken out. My reason for that is that both sections read exactly the same, with that exception. By reading these sections you will find that yesterday there was an amendment made to section 7, making the age twenty-five, which in both is the same now, and the only difference there is now is that one provides for senator and the other for representative. The senator requires a residence in the State of three years and the representative a residence of two years. If my amendment prevails, it will require a residence for both senator and representative of three years, and I think that is proper. One section in that case will answer for both. We have in this State some forty or fifty thousand men that have been residents for a long time, and I think that we can get enough out of those men to go to the Legislature without taking what we may term newcomers.

The amendment was agreed to.
            
The Convention then, at 5:10 o'clock p. m., adjourned.